




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JSOU Report 07-5

2007 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays



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Foreword

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) partnered with the Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) Division of the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) in sponsoring the annual essay contest. The first-place winner is recognized each year at the NDIA SO/LIC Symposium in mid-February, and the prize is \$1,000 cash. The runner-up receives \$500.

The competition is open to resident and nonresident students attending Professional Military Education (PME) institutions and has produced outstanding works on special operations issues. These essays provide insights on what our PME students see as priority national security issues today affecting special operations.

Essay contestants can choose any topic related to special operations. Submissions include hard-hitting and relevant recommendations that many Special Operations Forces commanders throughout United States Special Operations Command find very useful. Some entries submitted are a synopsis of the larger research project required for graduation or an advanced degree, while others are written specifically for the essay contest. Regardless of approach, these essays add value to the individuals' professional development, provide an outlet for expressing new ideas and points of view, and contribute to the special operations community as a whole.

JSOU is pleased to offer this selection of essays from the 2007 contest. The JSOU intent is that this compendium will benefit the reader professionally and encourage future PME students to enter the contest. Feedback is welcome, and your suggestions will be incorporated into future JSOU reports.

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, and Mr. Kenneth J. Alnwick, NDIA SO/LIC Division coordinator, thank all who participated in the 2007 Special Operations Essay Contest.

Cyber-Herding: Exploiting Islamic Extremists Use of the Internet

David B. Moon

The Internet provides Islamic extremists a golden opportunity to bypass normal media outlets and take their message directly to the people. This allows them to spread their ideas to an ever-growing audience. Utilizing the cyber-herding process, extremists' information operations can be taken over and their messages and ideas modified to make them less appealing to their target audiences.

The author knows no public or private agencies, organizations, groups, or individuals engaged in cyber-herding as described in this paper or any similar activities. It is entirely possible that some entity is engaged in cyber-herding or similar activities, but this author could not find any evidence in the public record to indicate anyone is practicing cyber-herding.

Introduction

On 28 November 2006, the Al-Fajr Information Center released the first issue of *Technical Mujahideen Magazine*.¹ The purpose of this online publication is to help prevent aggressive acts against Muslims in cyberspace and to assist the *mujahideen*—Muslims who proclaim themselves warriors for the faith (Holy Warriors)—in their efforts.² The magazine proclaims that the Internet provides a golden opportunity for the *mujahideen* to break the Western media control over information. The magazine also recognizes that the Internet could represent a vulnerability to the *mujahideen* and suggests security measures for the *mujahideen* to follow.

The Internet is truly a golden opportunity for the *mujahideen*. The Internet provides Islamic extremists an excellent medium to spread


Captain David Moon is a U.S. Air Force communications officer. He submitted this paper while attending the Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California) where he is pursuing his M.S. in Joint Information Operations. Captain Moon's paper was the winning entry in the 2007 Special Operations Essay Contest.

their ideas to billions of people, and over the years, the extremists have steadily made a greater presence on the information superhighway. As an example, Gabriel Weimann states that since 1998, “the number of terrorists’ Web sites has grown from less than 30 to more than 4,300.”³ Islamic extremists have used these sites for recruitment, fundraising, coordination, training, propaganda, and a whole host of different activities.

While all of these activities service Islamic extremists’ multiple interest, the spreading of their propaganda is perhaps the most dangerous. Over the years, these extremists have learned to shape their messages toward Muslim audiences. The messages point out unfair policies of the West against Muslim countries, how the West blindly supports Israel against the “poor” Palestinian people, and the attempts of the West to control the Muslim world. The recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have only added fuel to this message. The extremists have used these conflicts to reshape their messages—that is, they have showed the West attacking and occupying two Muslim countries. The Muslim world has fertile ground for messages of this nature, as evidenced by the following figure selections from the Pew Global Attitudes Project report, entitled *The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other*.⁴

The results from the Muslims interviewed reveal a very negative image of the West. Islamic extremists shape their messages to reinforce this negative view. The first step for countering these messages is to understand the medium that the extremists are using. The Internet has many characteristics that support extremists’ information operations, such as being able to reach large audiences. Yet the Internet also has inherent weaknesses that can be exploited. One of these weaknesses is the ambiguous nature of the net. You trust that when you go to a Web site, it is legitimate—that is, if it looks professional, you tend to believe that the site is real. However, criminals or terrorists could just as easily be running that site. The same is true when you chat with someone online. They could be who they say they are, but they could just as easily be someone else pretending to be the person you want them to be. A group called “Perverved Justice,” as featured on *Dateline NBC*, is an example; they have made great strides in catching child predators by using the ambiguous nature of the Internet.⁵


Negative Characteristics Associated with Westerners (Muslim Respondents)



Lighter shading indicates Muslim subpopulations in Western European countries.

In Pakistan, the percentage of Don't Know/Refuse responses ranges from 28% to 42% on these characteristics.

Positive Characteristics Associated with Westerners (Muslim Respondents)



Lighter shading indicates Muslim subpopulations in Western European countries.

In Pakistan, the percentage of Don't Know/Refuse responses ranges from 26% to 36% on these characteristics.

Used by permission from Pew Global Attitudes Project

The decentralized nature of terrorist organizations is an inherent weakness that can be exploited using the Internet. Many terrorist organizations that do not have state sponsorship organize and accomplish work utilizing social networks versus a hierarchy command structure. This practice makes sense. Individuals engaged in criminal activities need to work with people they trust so they can accomplish their mission. Social networks are very reliable in the physical world, but can be exploited in the virtual world because those personalities may be fictitious.

Defining Cyber-Herding

In order to exploit these weaknesses, consider developing a cyber system—generically referred to as *cyber-herding*—that invisibly drives Islamic extremists from terrorist Web sites to covertly controlled Web sites.⁶ Cyber-herding is the action by which an individual, group, or organization drives individuals, groups, or organizations to a desired location within the electronic realm.


Why implement cyber-herding versus engaging in an all-out war on extremist Web sites? The answer to that question lies in the realm of intelligence gathering and in the freedom of the Internet:

- a. While the threat from Islamic extremists' use of the Internet is high, intelligence agencies have successfully harvested information from these sites. Thus an all-out denial-of-service attack on extremists' Web sites would limit the capability of intelligence agencies to gather information.
- b. Some extremists' Web sites have been actively targeted and shut down, but the freedom of the Internet allows extremists to restore or relocate their Web sites in a matter of hours to days. Thus these attacks could embolden the extremists by reinforcing the fact that they can set up a new site within a short period. Simply stated, the attacks and subsequent re-emergence could provide them with a simple affirmation: The powerful United States tries to keep us off the Internet but they cannot!

In contrast to an all-out war, cyber-herding covertly neutralizes undesirable Web sites, mines data from controlled Web sites, maps virtual social networks, manipulates extremist messages, and modifies the extremists' story.

Implementing Cyber-Herding

To effectively implement a cyber-herding program, a minimum of four nodes are required.



| Node | Objective |
|--------------|--|
| Gatherer | Compile and maintain an up-to-date list for all extremists' related uses of the Internet. |
| Network | Insert themselves into the extremists' virtual social network. Identify major "hubs" and "links" within the extremists' virtual social network. |
| Construction | Create realistic <i>doppelganger</i> —ghostly double or a look alike—extremists Web sites and chat rooms. (In some traditions, it is an omen of death to see your own doppelganger.) Create several content-rich <i>Darknet</i> environments—a private virtual network where users connect only to people they trust ⁷ —that offer e-mail, file sharing, chat, instant messenger, and streaming video services. |
| Demolition | Remotely destroy or disable all extremists' Web activities (e.g., sites, chat rooms, and Darknets). |

Phase 1, Gather. The gatherer node begins the cyber-herding process by tracking down extremists' Web sites and chat rooms. To facilitate this phase, the node seeks public help by placing Web-based advertisements asking people to submit Uniform Resource Locators (URL) for any suspected extremist Web site.⁸ The node seeks out help from private groups such as the Rand Corporation, the Search for International Terrorist (SITE) Institute, and the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) and academic terrorism research groups.⁹ The node compiles a list of extremist Web site URLs. This list becomes

a living document that the node constantly updates with identified extremists' sites. In addition, a program constantly checks identified URLs to verify the sites are still active and automatically deletes dead sites. During this process, the network node makes a copy of the list and begins Phase 2.

Phase 2, Network. Upon accessing a site on the list, the members of the network node pose as Islamic extremist sympathizers and/or supporters and begin interacting with members of the site. In chat rooms, the node members start or join conversations supporting extremists themes. The objective is to develop trust relationships with Islamic extremists. Node members contact extremists' Web sites to see what they can do to support the cause. If needed to help build trust, the network node would have the authority to make small donations to extremists Web sites.

During this phase, the network node maps the extremists' chat rooms. Mapping a chat room involves creating a social network diagram of who is talking to whom. The members of the network node are looking for "hubs" using the sites. These hubs are people who have more connections than anyone else. In his book *The Tipping Point*, Malcolm Gladwell refers to these people as "connectors."¹⁰

The members of the network node develop virtual fictitious identities. They keep detailed records of their conversations for each identity. This way any member of the network node can be that virtual person. All they have to do is pick a character and research his or her history before chatting.

If the network node discovers any Web sites *not* identified on the Phase 1 master list, they add the new URLs to the list and forward these sites to the gatherer node. The members of network node mark the list to identify sites they are currently working; this practice ensures that the demolition node does not destroy those sites. Subsequently, the network node forwards the list to the construction node.


Phase 3, Construct. After the members of the construction node receive the list from the network node, they start accessing the sites. They copy the content, format, graphics, files, and links of each site. Using this information, the construction node builds doppelganger extremists' Web sites, which are independent—that is, having only passing similarities with other existing sites. At no time will the construction

node hijack an existing extremist Web site because this could cause distrust in the target audience.¹¹

The construction node forwards all created sites to the network node, who then endorses them with their contacts. The members of the construction node remove all Web sites that the network node marked and any sites they created from the list. Then the construction node forwards the list to the demolition node.

Phase 4, Demolish. After receiving the list from the construction node, the demolition node systematically begins a process of attacking every site on the list. These attacks can be simple such as contacting the sites service provider to protest in an attempt to get the site removed. They can also use more sophisticated attacks such as denial of service attacks, hijacking a Web site, Structured Query Language (SQL) injections, Cross Site Scripting cookie stealing, JavaScript injections, and other hacking methods.¹² Depending on where the host server is located, it may not be politically feasible to attack some sites directly. In these cases, the demolition node might post the extremists' URLs on Internet chat rooms and blogs in the hope that private citizens and/or groups can bring down the sites.

The appendix to this essay is a mathematical model that uses Gabriel Weimann's sparse numbers on extremists' Web sites to determine the growth rate.¹³ The result is that at least 2.33 Web extremists' Web sites are created each day. At this rate, the estimated number of extremists' Web sites in 2006 was about 6,850. Using this data, the construction node would need to take down at least 2.33 Web sites a day if the objective was to just maintain the status quo. The estimate for *parity* is 711 days if the demolition node can take down an average



of 9 Web sites a day and the construction node can build Web sites at an average of 2.33 Web sites a day. Once parity is achieved (as illustrated in the next figure), Phase 5 begins.

Phases 1 through 4 highlighted the basic mechanics of the cyber-herding process. The next three phases look at changing the extremist messages, concentrating Web sites, and developing Darknets. A visual illustration of the entire process follows Phase 7.

Phase 5, Change Message. The purpose of Phase 5 is to change the message. Islamic extremists are essentially salesmen; they sell their ideology to the world. As good salesmen, they highlight the positive qualities of their movement and suppress the negative aspects. Islamic extremists suppress two main items: a) the violence they commit and b) the desire to impose their harsh version of an Islamic state upon people, states, and nations. Virtually all Internet Islamic extremists expound about the need for an Islamic state. For them, this state would solve all of the world's problems. However, none of them actually describes what an Islamic state would look like or how it would function.


Extremists' violence and desire for an Islamic state are weaknesses that Phase 5 exploits. During this phase, the construction node makes subtle changes to the Web sites under their control to highlight violent acts committed by extremists. In the view of most Muslims, Islam is the religion of peace. To them, the association of violence and Islam is a contradiction. By focusing on the violent acts committed by Islamic extremists in the name of Allah, support for the extremists should wane within the Muslim community.

In this phase, the construction node also starts to describe what an Islamic state will look like and how it will function. However, each site has a different version of what an Islamic state will look like. Some sites focus on installing an Islamic Caliphate, while others focus on national Islamic states.¹⁴ The *Caliphate* is an Islamic federal government that represents both political leadership and unities of the Muslim world applying Islamic rule known as Shariah law.¹⁵ Because no set Shariah law exists—that is, as recognized by all Muslims—each site has its own version of Shariah law that will be enforced under the Islamic state.¹⁶

The sites also highlight the role of women in an Islamic state, rights of non-Muslims, and punishments for violating Shariah law.

The ultimate purpose is to let potential supporters of the sites know what they are getting into. An Islamic state may sound like a good idea to many Muslims. However, once they understand the details, they may start questioning whether the idea is good or not. In addition, attaching different versions of an Islamic state to different extremist groups should foster hostilities between them and thereby help keep the different factions from uniting to achieve their goals.

Phase 6, Concentrate Web Sites. Using the math model, by day 1,032 virtually all of the extremists' Web sites could potentially be eliminated. At this time, the construction node stops making new Web sites. The demolition node continues to attack any identified Islamic extremists' sites and starts to shut down construction node sites at the same rate they were attacking the extremists' Web sites. At this pace, all Web sites are eliminated by day 1375. On day 1369, the demolition node stops shutting down sites created by the construction node to leave about 50 sites in operation for monitoring and message control (as illustrated in the next figure). The demolition node continues to attack any extremists' Web site that makes it on the list.



Phase 7, Develop Darknet. During this phase, the construction node develops content-rich Darknet environments. As stated earlier, a Darknet is a virtual private network where users connect only to people they trust.¹⁷ These Darknet environments offer e-mail, file sharing, chat, instant messenger, and streaming video services. Once a Darknet is created, the construction node sends the URL to the network node.

The network node picks a connector with which they have developed a strong trust relationship and invites him or her to become a member of the Darknet. This invitation comes in the form of three e-mails to give the URL of the site, temporary user name, and temporary password, respectively. When the connector clicks on the URL, a Web site opens. The only thing on this site is two fields for a user name and password and a submit button. When the connector completes the fields and clicks the button, a prompt appears requesting the user to establish a new user name and password. When that task is complete, a welcome message appears with the following information:

- a. You are entering a secure Web site developed to promote the Islamic extremists' causes and were chosen for access because of your faith and dedication.
- b. You can invite up to 10 people to join the Web site, but only invite those you trust 100 percent.

The purpose of the message is to make the user not only feel special for being chosen but also secure.


If the connector likes the Web site, he may choose to invite others. On the other hand, if he does not like the Web site, the network node will have to start over with a new connector. Anyone invited to join the network will go through the same process as the connector. Using small-world theory, the network node can have extremists build a detailed map of their virtual social network.¹⁸ In his 1967 study, psychologist Stanley Milgram illustrates this theory by showing that no less than six people separate people from each other.¹⁹ The Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon game is another illustration because the objective is to connect any Hollywood actor with Kevin Bacon within six associations.²⁰

As people join the Darknet, a computer program constructs a social network map showing the connections between the individuals and people that invited them to join the network. The program also performs as follows:

- a. Updates the map whenever users send e-mails from their Darknet e-mail account and chat with other Darknet users.
- b. Runs Internet Protocol (IP) and e-mail tracking software against all users. This software provides geographical locations for each user's IP address and e-mail.

- c. Provides contact information on the person that owns the IP address and on the person's host service provider.

The social network map incorporates all of this information. The map can be used to identify geographical clusters within the network, links between clusters, and vital network hubs that can be targeted for human intelligence surveillance. If multiple users are accessing the Darknet using the same computer, a possible headquarters for an extremist group may emerge that can be targeted for human intelligence. Another benefit of the Darknet is the ability to mine data from Darknet e-mail accounts, file sharing, and chat room conversations.²¹



Limits of Cyber-Herding

The major limitation of cyber-herding is language fluency. Every node involved in this process will need to be multilingual, with a focus on Arabic. Before the process can begin, an investment must be made into recruiting people fluent in Arabic and training people in the Arabic language. The other limitation is time. Cyber-herding is not a quick easy fix. It will take time to develop trust relationships and attack offensive Web sites. The last limitation is in changing

the message. The construction node can make subtle changes to the extremists' message by highlighting weakness in Islamic extremists' themes; however, cyber-herding cannot be used to try to change people's beliefs about America or the West. Any attempt to go down that path will lead to failure.

Conclusion

The Internet provides Islamic extremists a golden opportunity to bypass normal media outlets and take their message directly to the people. This opportunity allows them to spread their ideas to an ever-growing audience. Utilizing the cyber-herding process, extremists' information operations can be taken over and their messages and ideas modified to make them less appealing to their target audiences. Cyber-herding also increases monitoring and data collection of Islamic extremist information operations. Those willing to make cyber-herding a reality can seize the golden opportunity away from the Islamic extremists and make it their own. ↑

Endnotes


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3. Gabriel Weimann, *Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006), 15.
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19. Ibid.
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Appendix.

Moon's Math Model for Terrorist and Doppelganger Web Sites

1. Information on terrorist Web sites is very sparse; the only numbers available are as follows: 1998, 30 sites and 2003, 4,300 sites.
2. Used a spline micro to generate a spline curve:



The spline provided a straight line (vs. a curve) because only have two data points.

- Used the perform-spline function to estimate the numbers from the beginning of 1999:


| | |
|------|----------|
| 1999 | 30 |
| 2000 | 883.7915 |
| 2001 | 1737.974 |
| 2002 | 2591.896 |
| 2003 | 3445.948 |
| 2004 | 4300 |

- Then used regression data analysis on these numbers:

Summary Output

Regression Statistics

| | |
|-------------------|----------|
| Multiple R | 1 |
| R Square | 1 |
| Adjusted R Square | 1 |
| Standard Error | 0.165134 |
| Observations | 6 |



Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)

| | df | SS | MS | F | Significance F |
|------------|----|----------|----------|----------|----------------|
| Regression | 1 | 12762691 | 12762691 | 4.68E+08 | 2.74E-17 |
| Residual | 4 | 0.109077 | 0.027269 | | |
| Total: | 5 | 12762691 | | | |

df is Degrees of Freedom, SS is Sum of Squares, MS is Mean Square, F is Fisher, and Significance F is Significance Fisher.

| | Coefficients | Standard Error | t Stat | P-value |
|--------------|--------------|----------------|----------|----------|
| Intercept | -824.072 | 0.153732 | -5360.46 | 7.27E-15 |
| X Variable 1 | 853.9887 | 0.039475 | 21633.86 | 2.74E-17 |

| | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Lower 95% | Upper 95% |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Intercept | -824.499 | -823.646 | -824.499 | -823.646 |
| X Variable 1 | 853.8791 | 854.0983 | 853.8791 | 854.0983 |

Residual Output

| <i>Observation</i> | <i>Predicted Y</i> | <i>Residuals</i> |
|--------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| 1 | 29.91619 | 0.083813 |
| 2 | 883.9049 | 0.065397 |
| 3 | 1737.894 | -0.23375 |
| 4 | 2591.882 | 0.07653 |
| 5 | 3445.871 | -0.13247 |
| 6 | 4299.86 | 0.140475 |

5. The regression data analysis provided a slope of 853.988667595807 Web sites created yearly.
6. Estimated the numbers of terrorist Web sites for 2004 through 2006 using this slope.

| | |
|------|----------|
| 2004 | 5153.848 |
| 2005 | 6007.837 |
| 2006 | 6861.826 |

7. Divided the slope by 365 days to get the daily growth rate of terrorist Web sites, the result being 2.33969498 Web sites a day.

Models

Terrorist Web sites (TW)

$T(t+1) = Tt + \text{daily growth rate} - \text{demolition rate}$

Doppelganger Web sites (DW)

$D(t+1) = Dt + \text{daily growth rate}$

Demolition Rate is 9.

| <i>Status (Year)</i> | <i>TW</i> | <i>DW</i> |
|----------------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1 | 4437.475 | 1094.34 |
| 2 | 2073.067 | 2159.34 |
| 3 | 0 | 2516.34 |

When TW equals zero, model for DW changes to $D(t+1) = Dt + \text{daily growth rate} - \text{demolition rate}$.

| <i>Days</i> | <i>TW Sites</i> | <i>DW Sites</i> | <i>Days</i> | <i>TW Sites</i> | <i>DW Sites</i> |
|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1 | 6861.826 | 2.339695 | 1029 | 15.03244 | 3086.34 |
| 2 | 6855.166 | 5.339695 | 1030 | 8.372134 | 3089.34 |
| 3 | 6848.505 | 8.339695 | 1031 | 1.711829 | 3092.34 |
| 710 | 2139.67 | 2129.34 | 1367 | 0 | 68.3397 |
| 711 | 2133.009 | 2132.34 | 1368 | 0 | 59.3397 |
| 712 | 2126.349 | 2135.34 | 1369 | 0 | 50.3397 |

Limitations of the National Defense Union: Why the DoD-DI Relationship is Best Left at Home

Joe McGraw

The historically strong relationship between the Department of Defense and the American defense industry is challenged by the spread of this relationship into today's combat environments. The fulfillment of U.S. strategy demands attention in three areas: differences in strategic objectives, considerations for the ethical conduct of combat, and concerns over Constitutional war powers.¹

The historical relationship between the United States (U.S.) Department of Defense (DoD) and the American defense industry (DI) has been an extremely positive one. Images of the great material production of World War II spring immediately to mind. More recently, the great technological innovations made possible by the relationship between the DoD and DI have led to super offensive weapons and life-saving defensive armament that have no global equivalent. Historically this has been a relationship limited to the physical boundaries of the U.S.; the direct projection of that material into combat has always been the strict province of the U.S. Government. Then came 9/11, the Global War on Terror, and a greater demand for personnel than our government agencies could provide.

Unfortunately, our national experiment to project the DI directly into combat zones has proven not nearly as effective as the historical relationship. Forced out of a sense of national security that demanded emergent action, the U.S. has attempted to extend the DoD-DI

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relationship into areas where it does not work effectively. In fact, the extension of the DI directly into contested areas of battle space has been at times counterproductive. The images of the DoD-DI today do not conjure up images of B-17s on assemblage lines, but rather those of American civilians killed or captured while going to work.

The conclusion of this paper—that American citizen contractors should not be permitted in U.S. designated combat areas—is not new; however, the lines of reasoning are unique. Other arguments decry the nation's use of private contractors in order to support a wider antiwar agenda, to loft criticism on the current administration, or as a rejection of our national strategic aims. This discussion is different; it is a proposal to end the use of contractors because their combat zone presence is eminently harmful to the projection of U.S. power. In other words, our ability to reach national strategic ends is hampered by the deployment of American-citizen contractors. To support that claim, this paper investigates the three areas that are most severely affected by the forward presence of the DoD-DI relationship: strategic objectives, ethical means, and Constitutional considerations.

Objective Differences

The strategic objectives of the DoD and those of the DI are radically different. The DoD is charged with fighting and winning the nation's wars to ensure the security of the country and its citizens. The various companies that make up the DI are charged with increasing the wealth of their shareholders. This is not a slight or a criticism of the DI; it is simply reality, and normally a very positive attribute of the American free-market system. Arguably, it was the American free-market system and its ability to produce that was chiefly responsible for U.S. victories in the two global conflicts of the 20th century. Clearly the differences in strategic objectives did not harm the nation's ability to pursue national objectives in the past, so why the problem now? In the past, American companies and employees did not venture into active combat zones. It is precisely there, beyond the acceptable limitations of DoD and DI union, that the differences in objective create friction.

Even with strategic differences, the connection between DoD and DI in a peacetime environment is symbiotic; the growth and success

of one supports the same in the other. When the relationship is extended spatially into an environment of sustained active combat—war by any label—it is more correctly termed *syncretism*—that is, the attempted union or fusion of two radically different philosophies. Beyond the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) or within the designated Area of Operations (AO), the DoD is focused on pursuing lines of operations to ensure strategic victory. The DoD is not primarily concerned with the monetary cost; profit, market share, and quarterly earnings do not figure into the decision making of military commanders. For those companies of the DI that deploy should-

The DoD is not primarily concerned with the monetary cost For those companies of the DI that deploy shoulder to shoulder with the military, such things do matter.

der to shoulder with the military, such things do matter. In terms of national blood and treasure, if a DoD operation suddenly turns out to be more costly than expected, a change in operational objectives might be in order to reach the strategic ends. Perhaps more resources are required to overcome a tougher than expected adversary. The point is, the strategic ends remain the same—fight and win the nation's wars. When an American company finds the expenses greater than expected, the result is quite different: they leave. They can leave because their success is not tied to American foreign policy pursuits, and it is not their duty or responsibility to ensure national security. Again, this characterization is not intended to color the DI as unpatriotic or greedy, but simply to explain the natural tension created when the free market enters a combat zone.

The different strategic objective between DoD and the DI leads directly to problems in sustaining a unity of effort. The reasons are quite apparent. The DoD can undertake a civic project, a military objective, or a governmental activity and see it through to completion regardless of the costs. So long as the national leadership is willing to pursue policy aims and national interests, the DoD can continue to dedicate resources to the effort. The DI simply cannot work along similar lines. Regardless of the national interests at stake, at some point the danger to company employees becomes too great. At some point the lack of future profits becomes too debilitating. At some point the company shareholders become too disgusted at the loss in share price. In short, when the country pursues national interests through

military force, the DoD can withstand changes in environment, military setbacks, and increasing monetary costs. Companies within the DI cannot. When the DoD relies on such companies to fulfill supporting roles inside the contested battle space, and those companies can not sustain the effort and choose to exit the arena, the efforts of the DoD and the entire U.S. Government are undermined.

Foreign populations are not concerned with the differences in strategic objectives. Point of fact: when the U.S. Government promises to provide security, clean the water, turn on the power, or repair the communications grid, foreign audiences do not differentiate between American government officials and American citizens working for DI companies. In the eyes of affected citizenry, both are efforts under the auspice of the U.S. Government. When a project fails or a promise goes undelivered, the blame falls on the country, not the company. Unity of effort is substantially more important than the potential efficiency of the free market in counterinsurgency and nation-building environments.

Ethical Means

The U.S. use of private contractors in the battle space of the current conflict undermines America's strategic requirement to gain ethical dominance. To effectively engage the enemies confronting the U.S. in the Global War on Terror, in the environments where they exist, requires a national and international debate on the ethical, military means allowable. The U.S. finds itself fighting an enemy that is not only comprised of transnational networks but also embedded into local communities. These networks are organizations that wear no uniforms or distinctive markings, avoid direct confrontation with military forces, and openly advertise collateral damage as a propaganda tool against their adversaries. In short, these are enemy organizations that are using the very concepts of western, Just War discourse as strategic advantage. By wrapping a community of supporters around their organizations, they effectively create safe areas that cannot be engaged. Or at least they could not be engaged in the past.

Current events make it increasingly apparent that the U.S. and her allies are being forced to take the fight directly to the communities that support our adversaries. Recent campaigns and conflicts have demonstrated the strength of such community-based organizations.

The failed Israeli attack on Hezbollah positions in the summer of 2006, the repeated failure of the Pakistani government to control North Waziristan, and the growing threat of the Sadr militia in Baghdad are all examples of what does not work to thwart this new type of threat organization. Something else is in order: a new means for attacking the threat where it lives, and the ethical clarity that it is they—the terrorists—who are responsible for collateral damage and death, not us. Such clarity is not possible when we also have non-uniformed civilians pursuing political objectives in the battle space.

To ensure national security, the U.S. will be forced to attack terrorist organizations in their community defenses. The only way this can be done successfully is to make the ethical case that such action is defensive, the terrorists who seek refuge in those areas are illegal combatants, and the unavoidable death to innocents is the responsibility of the terrorists, not the United States. American leaders can only make this case by invoking the Hague and Geneva Conventions and the Geneva protocols and citing the illegality in the actions of the terrorists themselves. Before the nation can do this, however, we must clean our own house. We can no longer allow American companies and their American citizen employees to move about the battlefield, armed or unarmed, in the pursuit of political objectives. We can no longer rely on private security companies to protect logistical trains or supply depots. We can no longer accept that the DoD must be supplemented with private industry within contested battle space. This goes beyond the relevant issues of how to protect and punish individual DI employees. The argument here is that the use of American private citizens in this manner necessarily restricts the means available to the DoD. The U.S. cannot make an effective ethical case for engaging illegal combatants when our own nation employs civilian contractors to support the physical acts of war.

The ethical realm makes for a very stark national decision. If the nation continues current practice, and continues to employ DI private companies and American citizens, we as a nation either restrict the available options to the DoD or face the certain charges of hypocrisy and tyranny by the international community. However, by ending the practice, by limiting the cooperation of DoD and DI to sovereign areas of stability, the nation is freed from our self-imposed restraints so that we might effectively take the fight to the enemy—where he lives. It is possible to both remain true to our ethical standards for

prosecuting war and decisively engage terrorist communities, but the nation must first remove our own civilians from the battlefield.

Constitutional Concerns

The use of DI companies and contractors in the current battle space is not the result of an evil conspiracy between national leaders and private industry. It is the result of pragmatic decisions made with an eye on short-term efficiencies. The DoD simply did not have the personnel, numbers, or expertise to immediately launch into a conflict spread across the globe, and one which required multiple campaigns featuring nation-building efforts. While the current situation is understandable—a nation does go to war with the team it has—one must reflect on the Constitutional concerns that the DoD-DI relationship raises. The very way in which we have supplemented the DoD to pursue political objectives is Constitutionally questionable.

The founding fathers considered war to be a serious issue, but one that would have to be pursued from time to time. As such, the framers built checks on the power of the branches to pursue war. The Constitution is very clear on the subject; it provides exceptional executive powers to the President during times of war and legislative checks on the executive's power to pursue policy aims through war. Specifically, the legislature is given the responsibility to raise, fund, and maintain the separate military services. Inherent in this responsibility is the power to limit or grow the size of the services through funding.

The use of private companies and citizens to supplement the DoD is a Constitutional issue because it erodes the power of the legislature to “raise and support” the services. While the Congress still approves the budget, the services can use discretionary funds and purchase capabilities through DI contracts. Supplemental bills provide additional funds for contracting at the discretion of the DoD. This all adds up to a DoD that remains strategically unequipped to prosecute the conflict at hand, while the missing ingredients are continuously provided by the DI directly into the battle space. In so doing, the services themselves assume the responsibility to “raise and support.” The DoD is an agency of the executive and, therefore, does not have the Constitutional authority to raise and support itself. The executive branch, through the use of DI contracts, has obtained power not granted to it. Furthermore, the continued ero-

sion of the legislative “check” on the executive’s power to pursue war is unhealthy for the nation. The DoD projection of DI companies and employees into combat zones is uncomfortably close to becoming, in a word, unconstitutional.

To be clear, this is not a rebuke of the President or a free-pass for the Congress. It is the legislature’s responsibility to uphold their Constitutional duties, not the other branches of government. Constitutionally, the legislature does not have the option of allowing the services to grow themselves or to supplement their own capabilities through the DI. Because the U.S. Congress is fully responsible for such decisions, they must fulfill that role.

The Reasons Why

In light of the current political climate, it is critical to point out what this argument is not. It is not a rebuke or a critique of those American citizens who are working as private industry contractors. Too often these people are portrayed as nothing short of mercenaries, which is not true. Many are decorated military veterans, and almost all personally support the national objectives that they help pursue. Nor is this an argument against the DI or the companies that comprise it. The U.S. simply could not pursue its many national interests without the American DI and the free market that it operates in. When the DI is limited physically to operating exclusively outside of U.S. combat areas, the relationship between the DI and the DoD is an incredibly useful instrument of national power. Finally, this is not a criticism of the U.S. Government for allowing the DoD-DI relationship to blow past its functional limitations into the physically contested areas of the Global War on Terror. National leaders did what they thought had to be done in order to execute the national strategy. The limited resources and capabilities to execute the Global War on Terror required emergency action. What is important now is to recognize the limitations of the DoD-DI relationship and to take the necessary corrective actions.

Recommendations

Clearly, it is time to move the DI back into a more positive relationship with the DoD. To do this, the DI must be restricted to the physical space outside of all U.S. declared combat areas. This restriction

includes not only companies and citizens working with the DoD but also those contractors working with any agency of the U.S. Government. In short, all Americans working in combat areas should work for, and be employed by, the U.S. Government. This restriction would ensure a unity of effort, at least within agencies, that we do not currently possess. Similarly, by restricting the DI from combat zones, the nation is more able to employ the necessary military means to engage an enemy that employs human camouflage. To destroy terrorist organizations, the U.S. is going to require the moral courage and standing to declare such terrorists “illegal combatants” and to raid the communities that they hide within. Finally, it has been over 5 years since the U.S. Government required emergency action to engage the immediate threat. The Constitutional concerns raised by employing private companies and contractors should be put to rest. The sustainability of our national strategy demands it.

The need for corrective action is not completely unnoticed or unrecognized. One of the most underreported elements within the President’s State of the Union Address in January 2007 is also the most germane to this argument. The President briefly mentioned a State Department initiative called the Civilian Reserve Corps. This initiative would provide on-demand experts that could supplement national efforts as working representatives of the U.S. Government. While the initiative is limited in scope, similar initiatives—spread across the wealth of governmental agencies—could provide the enhanced capabilities that we currently seek out through the DI. This project is worthy of national attention and resources. In fact, it is precisely through the DI that the nation can expect to find the valuable personnel, as well as the responsible companies, that would provide the bodies for the Civilian Reserve Corps.

What is most required at this time is a national recognition of the problem. The DI-DoD relationship has historical significance and is one of the primary reasons the U.S. emerged from the 20th century as the world’s sole superpower. The American free market, and the DI it created, is a positive force for American power and national security. However, the leap of this relationship into the physical battle space of the Global War on Terror has come with a cost. Instead of the efficiency that we normally think inherent of free market systems, the spatial transition of the DI into active war zones has led to strategic inefficiency. By limiting the physical presence of the DI and

increasing the capabilities of U.S. Government agencies including the DoD, the U.S. can better pursue the necessary national objectives that we have laid out before us. ↑

Endnote

1. The author would like to acknowledge that he developed the arguments presented in this paper through months of discussions with Anna Simons, Don Redd, and Duane Lauchengco—his coauthors of “The Sovereignty Solution,” *The American Interest* (March/April 2007), pages 33-42.

Conventionalization of Special Operations and Its Impact on Innovation

Michael P. Sullivan

Innovative thought has long been the common denominator in defining special operations. However, institutionalized conventional authority is permeating to the lowest levels of the United States Special Operations Forces (SOF). SOF are caught in a conventionalized organization that is structured to replicate the indoctrinated special operations of the past, rather than developing the creative tactics, techniques, procedures, and supporting technology that will define the future of SOF.

In response to allegations that the British military mind had become “characterized by conventional thinking, lack of imagination, unwillingness to challenge accepted doctrine, excessive caution, professional pessimism, narrowness of outlook, and subservience to the views of higher authority,”¹ Air Vice-Marshal R. A. Mason, Royal Air Force, commented that “without innovation, a nation’s way of war becomes predictable; and predictable means vulnerable.”² As the U.S. SOF enter the fifth year of the war on terrorism, many question the lack of innovation and resulting predictability of U.S. special warfare. Without innovation, is there anything special about special operations?

Innovative thought has long been the common denominator in defining special operations. However, institutionalized conventional authority is permeating to the lowest levels of the U.S. SOF and thus suffocating the “bottom-up” innovation that has long characterized the operations as “special.” Company and field grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers are no longer rewarded for free-thinking and creative use of operational tactics and technology to define the current and future of special warfare. SOF are caught in

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a conventionalized organization that is structured to replicate the indoctrinated special operations of the past, rather than developing the creative tactics, techniques, procedures, and supporting technology that will define the operational and strategic policies of the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the direction of SOF's future.

First, it is important to understand the link between special operations and innovation. *Innovation* is understood from an organizational perspective as "the introduction of a new thing or method. Innovation is the embodiment, combination, or synthesis of knowledge in original, relevant, valued new products, processes, or services."³ However the definition goes beyond this basic statement that could be misunderstood as synonyms for *creativity*. Unlike creativity, innovation takes the "new thing or method" and makes it useful. Innovation is the successful implementation of creative ideas within an organization. While creativity is the necessary starting point, creativity alone does not establish innovation.⁴

Special operations are in essence the practical implementation of new and creative methods for conducting warfare. It is this unique quality that sets these operations apart from conventional operations, which are defined by predictable and standardized doctrine, behavior, training, and equipment. *Conventional* operations (not defined in any U.S. joint publication) are those operations that have become synonymous with the proven doctrines of attack, defend, and withdrawal. However, after the more recent historic successes of employing sophisticated weapon systems during the Gulf War and the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, conventional operations are becoming characterized as "short wars, without the extended periods for mobilization and reinforcement that have characterized wars traditionally and offering little opportunity for tactical or technological revision or reequipment [sic] once the fighting starts."⁵ This new definition of conventional operations exclusively limits any potential innovation.

Special operations are in essence the practical implementation of new and creative methods for conducting warfare.

One might argue that the accepted joint definition of special operations does not cite innovation or creative tactics and technology as an essential feature. Special operations are defined by the

Department of Defense (DOD) *Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary and Associated Terms* as follows:

Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.⁶

A closer analysis of the definition, however, reveals that “special operations differ from conventional operations in operational technique.”⁷ Nevertheless, one cannot automatically assume that different techniques are necessarily new or innovative.

The Joint Publication 1-02 definition does imply that special operations provide innovative solutions to a common objective. This implication is pulled from the “degree of political risk” phrase in the definition. It must be understood that this “risk” encapsulates the underlying inherent cost benefit analysis of conducting the operation. It is not simply the degree of risk but the overwhelming benefit or cost associated with that risk that makes special operations unique or “different.” What makes these operations different is a viable creative alternative or innovative option.

Historically, special operations are often unduly categorized as a type of “elite” conventional operation similar to those we see SOF conducting currently. However, unlike the operational “repeats” SOF are conducting today in support of conventional operational and strategic objectives, these historic operations were clearly the most innovative of their time and provided senior political and military leaders with a new and viable alternative to a conventional solution.

Upon analysis, one would find that all of the following operations are the first of their kind and alien to the conventional way of thinking at that particular time in history:

- a. Operation Oak, the rescue of Mussolini
- b. Operation Source, the British midget submarine attack on *Tirpitz*
- c. Operation Kingpin, the U.S. Army raid on Son Tay
- d. Operation Noah's Ark, the Office of Strategic Services guerilla operations of World War II
- e. Buon Enao experiment, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Vietnam village self-defense program
- f. Initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom, the CIA plan to back the Northern Alliance with SOF expertise and U.S. close air support.

It was the innovative and viable use of new tactics and technology that set these operations apart as a "special" alternative.

So how were these creative military ideas fostered into innovative practical use? The answer lies within an organization that was either fostered or forced in most cases to accept operational change. Historical analysis identifies that all of these operations were allowed to take place despite their inherent opposition to the conventional status quo. The leadership in each case understood that creative thinking could not "be achieved simply by using the same cultural norms along with a system of rewards or encouragement from the top."⁸

As discussed earlier, innovation is best understood from an organizational perspective. In military operations it is the process of taking creative ideas and structuring them for effective implementation. The creative ideas of the individual or team must be translated by the organizational structure into something that is useful and capable of mission success. In *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, Hy Rothstein states, "A common remark with respect to organizations is that it is not the organization that is important; it is the people in it."⁹ Rothstein, however, also surfaces two errors in the "only the people matter" mentality. First, leaders are products of their environment, which includes the organization where they grow up; and second, one's accomplishments

are dependent upon one's authority and resources.¹⁰ Therefore, the organization itself must be structured to foster creativity and have the management tools (authority and resources) to translate that creativity into innovative methods. The problem is that management of this type of organization is contrary to the bureaucratic model that both conventional and SOF are founded upon.

Both conventional and SOF military leaders have gravitated towards the bureaucratic type of management due to the prevailing belief that it is "technically superior to all other forms of administration."¹¹ The fundamental problem with this type of management is that its principal structure is designed to stabilize the organization and operations along predictable lines with a top-down graded authority. In this structure the "legitimate" experts reside at the top after years of institutionalized training and promotion. Original solutions are believed to best generate from the top; and dissent is punished, not rewarded. This tendency works contrary to the fundamental requirements for an organization structure to foster innovation despite the institutional belief that top-down encouragement and expertise will prevail. As Charlan Nemeth states:

Creativity in individuals and innovation at the organizational level are not so easily produced. Rather, the ability to think outside the box to find truly original solutions to old problems requires the freedom to break the rules and to consider different options without fear of reprisals or rejection within the organization hierarchy. Research findings show that dissent actually stimulates originality and better decision-making procedures.¹²

So if innovation is so important to the conduct of special operations, why has SOF become so institutionally organized against it? The answer lies with the SOF need to legitimize its existence within the context of the larger conventional U.S. military structure. The leadership of SOF organizational structure is subject to the organizational environments they were promoted within. This situation has subsequently focused SOF to organize exactly as U.S. conventional forces have. As Rothstein points out, the *incentive* structures that operate the organization shape the *organizational* structure.¹³ This structure is one based on standard operating procedures developed to cope with uncertainty, not foster it; as a result, creativity and

innovation cannot promote and facilitate its growth.¹⁴ The overall interest of the organization is one of survival with a vested interest in proven doctrinal norms rather than associated with the risk of innovative behavior.

So what is the solution to bring innovation back to current and future U.S. special operations? The analysis leads to one conclusion and that is the need for a new organization structured on fostering and enabling innovation and not reliant on predictable behavior nurtured on doctrine, centralized authority, and resource control. The new organization must be developed to optimize key structural variables that are conducive to fostering innovation in an organization. Those variables are differentiation or diversity of occupational types, professionalism or richness of experience, decentralization, reduced formalization, and reduced stratification or a consensus against any preoccupation with status.¹⁵

Differentiation or diversity of the occupational types can only be achieved through aggressive recruiting both inside and outside military ranks. Recruitment efforts must expand beyond the military pool and focus not only on increasing numbers but increasing the number of qualified free-thinkers and creative minds that are sought after by the best corporate firms in the United States and abroad. Aggressive recruitment must focus on quality and avoid the current misconception that quantity will bring more solutions.

"Professionalism brings to the organization richness of experience, self confidence, inputs from external sources, increased boundary-spanning activity, standards of professionalism, and psychological commitment to moving beyond the status quo."¹⁶ This structural variable is already strong within SOF and the all volunteer force. The key is to ensure that this professionalism is continually fostered within the organization.

Decentralization can only be accomplished if the command and control structure of U.S. SOF disregards the current conventional bureaucratic organizational model. At the top, leadership needs to answer directly to National Command Authority.¹⁷ Authority and resources must be pushed down to the lowest levels, and competition for the development of new tactics and use of technology encouraged and rewarded. Creativity, initiative, and dissent (within acceptable boundaries) from doctrine cannot be punished.

The next foreseen requirement is for reduced formalization and stratification within the new organization. Formalization directly results in an increased predictability of performance, which as Air Vice-Marshal R. A. Mason said leads to vulnerability. Formalization lends itself to large bureaucracies, and bureaucracies lend themselves to stratification. "The preoccupation with status and inhibitions caused by status differences" that are inherent in large bureaucracies "inhibit the innovation process."¹⁸ Therefore, the new organization may end up resembling Microsoft, Apple, General Electric, or IBM more than big Army or mother Navy. Promotions and advancement and team structures should be built to support operational requirements, not those of career advancement.

The creation of a new organization alone will not immediately spark new innovations in special warfare. Attitudes and values of the top political and military leadership must change as well. Top management's attitudes and values towards innovation and creative behavior are critical to the overall innovative capacity of the organization. Leaders must accept change; values of strategic decision makers that are positive toward change will positively impact the creation of innovative options.¹⁹ This posture sets SOF up for success in providing operational techniques that differ from conventional operations.²⁰

Clausewitz observed that "war is the province of uncertainty." Mitigating that uncertainty cannot be left to creation of standard operating procedures alone. Leaders must remain open to viable alternatives that come from the bottom up by promoting creativity, resourcefulness, ingenuity, flexibility, initiative, and common sense. U.S. SOF must reorganize itself and abandon the bureaucratic organizational structure of the conventional force if it is to foster the viable innovative military alternatives that will define the special operations of the future. ↑

Endnotes

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12. Nemeth.
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Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan

Using United States Special Forces to Remain Village Focused

Matthew D. Coburn

This paper suggests a revised counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan. The strategy emphasizes controlling the population to separate it from the influence of insurgents. The strategy employs United States Special Forces to build indigenous police and self-defense forces inside of geographically linked villages and to couple the local indigenous forces with the Afghan National Army in order to deny the Taliban access to the population.

The Department of Defense has focused recently on the concept of irregular warfare as the doctrinal answer for engaging its enemies in the “Long War.” The focus has resulted in emerging counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine for the United States (U.S.) Army and Marine Corps and numerous academic works selling the concept of “clear, hold, and build.” The strategy places an emphasis on controlling a population to separate it from the influence of insurgents.¹

Recent academic work in the special operations community couples this strategy with Special Operations Forces working by, with, and through newly reorganized indigenous forces to focus efforts on controlling and separating a population from an insurgency at the village level.² After almost 5 years, the assets necessary to execute this indigenous and village-focused strategy exist in Afghanistan today. The strategy calls for utilizing U.S. Special Forces in two ways:

- a. Build indigenous paramilitary police and self-defense forces inside of geographically linked villages and towns.

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- b. Couple the local indigenous forces with the Afghan National Army (ANA) in order to deny the Taliban access to the population.³

This strategy will prevent the Taliban from acquiring the resources necessary to sustain their insurgency.

The Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan should shift to an indigenous and village-focused COIN strategy. This strategy should combine the effective use of the ANA, a U.S. Special Forces effort to raise local indigenous defense forces, and the “clear, hold, and build” methodology. This strategy will control the Afghan population at the village level, protect the population from Taliban insurgents, sever the Taliban’s access to resources, and ultimately defeat the insurgency in the most effective manner possible.

The soldiers of the ANA play a key role in the future of Afghanistan. Since the spring of 2002, U.S. Special Forces have played an integral role in the ANA’s development. While disjointed at times, this development has resulted in a sizeable force with the capabilities necessary to fulfill its duties in defeating the Taliban insurgency and securing Afghanistan for the long haul. Understanding the development of the ANA proves essential to properly employing them in a winning COIN strategy.

In early April 2002, Central Command tasked U.S. Special Forces to organize and train the ANA. The order called for units culturally experienced in training indigenous forces within austere and potentially hostile environments and capable of functioning without robust overhead and command and control.⁴ Over the next 15 months, the Special Forces led the organizing, training, and equipping of the first seven Afghan *kandaks* (Persian Dari for *battalion*). By summer 2003, the ANA finally provided a force capable of protecting the government of the transitional Islamic state of Afghanistan and projecting away from the Afghan capital city of Kabul in order to assist in COIN efforts.⁵

The creation of an army from scratch presented many issues that were not addressed in the original plan of creating the ANA. One of the issues that the Special Forces identified involved determining how to logistically and administratively sustain and maintain an indigenous army above the battalion and brigade levels. Doctrinally, Special Forces can organize, train, equip, and advise host-

nation forces up to the battalion and brigade levels. The mission in Operation Enduring Freedom called for staffing and sustaining at the corps level and above. This problem went beyond the scope of Special Forces battalion-level capabilities.

In the summer of 2003, Combined Joint Task Force 180 and the Office of Military Coordination-Afghanistan created Task Force Phoenix to lead the building and training of the ANA.⁶ The task force



Special Forces and Afghan National Army Marksmanship Training

deployed an ad hoc organization of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), pieced together from elements of the 10th Mountain Division and the Florida National Guard. The embedded training teams deployed with an enthusiastic attitude, and with their larger size were immediately able to impact the professionalism of the ANA. Many of the logistical

and administrative issues encountered by Special Forces advisors were either surmounted or reduced over the next 3 years. Task Force Phoenix possessed the capability of assigning officers and NCOs with the correct specializations alongside the relevant staff organizations in the ANA. In addition, the ANA continued to grow. The ANA currently fields 40 battalions, 24 being the combat-arms type.⁷

A potential weakness of this plan developed from the danger of *mirroring*.⁸ Mirroring occurs if conventional forces advise the ANA to organize, train, and fight like conventional forces. This becomes an issue if the advisors feel uncomfortable or untrained in the complex asymmetric environment of irregular warfare. Where Task Force Phoenix displayed a decisive *strength* in advising ANA on actions such as logistical management, equipment maintenance, and administrative functions, their *weakness* was the inability to decentralize, train, and fight in an asymmetric capacity.

The original stationing of the ANA *kandaks* presented another weakness. The original concept called for the *kandaks* to form under a central corps centered in and just outside the capital city of Kabul. Meanwhile, the Special Forces—focused on securing the Afghan population and defeating the Taliban—remained distributed around

southeastern and eastern Afghanistan. While the Special Forces knew their areas of operation, the ANA (who rotated for month-long deployments to each of the different firebases) were unable to establish solid ties with the local populations. This plan limited the effectiveness of the ANA. Although culturally and linguistically capable of operating in the different areas of operation, the ANA were unable to maximize their ability to produce information about the shadowy Taliban infrastructure. Recently, however, the ANA began to solve this problem. They stationed four of their brigades around the country in Qandahar, Gardez, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif and began rotating their *kandaks* forward to the Special Forces firebases located in the respective regions.

The Special Forces perception of ANA competence remains mixed. The Special Forces elements that played a part in building the ANA over the past 3 years are more comfortable working with the ANA because these Special Forces Operations Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) understand both the strengths and weaknesses of the ANA. The best solution for the improvement and employment of the ANA would decentralize their *kandaks* out to advanced operational bases (AOBs) and SFODAs as follows:

- a. Special Forces train and employ them unconventionally.
- b. Embedded trainers (possessing the skills, knowledge, and training to perform the appropriate logistic and administrative functions) maintain, sustain, and administer them as a functioning army.

An objective assessment of the ANA will find that the ANA represents the most competent indigenous force in Afghanistan. The ANA can function at the squad, platoon, and company levels and

An objective assessment of the ANA will find that the ANA represents the most competent indigenous force in Afghanistan.

thereby perform in the decentralized COIN environment where the most effective tactics involve small units. To most effectively employ the ANA, the Government of Afghanistan and the leaders of Operation Enduring Freedom may have to assume risk and decentralize the elements of the ANA to uncomfortable levels in support of sound COIN principles. Proper employment of the ANA must remain a key focus in any COIN strategy.

The indigenous and village-focused plan calls for Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan to maintain two Special Forces Forward Operating Bases that retain their focus on south-eastern and eastern Afghanistan, respectively. AOBs and SFODAs should deploy into towns and adjacent villages in “contested areas” of Afghanistan.⁹ Many of the AOBs and SFODAs may remain in their current dispositions; however, their overall focus will evolve. The controlled areas should be linked geographically in order to facilitate an ever growing expansion of the now proverbial “oil spot.”¹⁰ Special Forces and ANA will clear their areas of insurgents, but they will “hold” their villages and towns in accordance with sound, timeless COIN principles¹¹ and emerging U.S. Department of Defense COIN doctrine.¹²

Once established in their village, the Special Forces will focus their efforts on establishing and training a “constabulary force”¹³ of squad or platoon size.¹⁴ This police force will be the main effort of the strategy and must be sufficiently supported. Because most Afghan districts possess some form of rudimentary police, Special Forces help them evolve into the constabulary force. SFODAs must focus on building up the existing police forces that show promise *or* start from scratch in those areas where the villages either lack police or the police are corrupt. Once constabulary police forces are organized, trained, and equipped, they should be advised to specifically focus their efforts on determining the identities of the insurgent infrastructure in their villages through thorough police work and the development of intelligence and informant networks. The police forces’ knowledge of their neighbors, tribesmen, and family members coupled with Special Forces trained intelligence collection and light infantry skills will prove paramount in the success of the strategy. Supporting the police force will be the second element to be formed: the village self-defense force.¹⁵

The Special Forces should orient the self-defense force toward assisting the constabulary police force in securing, protecting, and controlling the population. The Special Forces organization, training, and employment of the self-defense force should mimic the Vietnam era 1st Special Forces Group (A) teams’ execution of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program.¹⁶ The self-defense force will consist mostly of part-time labor, thus facilitating the continuation of endeavors important to the village and tribal

economy, such as farming or small business. Each village should have a full-time platoon or company-sized element of self-defense force that remains available as follows:

- a. Assist the police force with implementing personnel resource control measures.
- b. Act as the village Quick Reaction Force—responding to any villagers in need and disrupting any insurgent attacks on the Special Forces, police force, or fellow villagers.

Former members of the Afghan Militia Forces and Afghan Security Forces, as well as local veterans of the ANA or Soviet invasion



ANA Raid of Taliban Camp

era *mujahideen*, would provide potentially sound village self-defense force members. Special Forces training in basic tasks such as check points, searches, ambushes, and react to ambushes—along with training in first aid, weapons, and communications skills—would prove appropriate. With the vil-

lages under physical control, a “movement to contact (MTC) force” will fill the void in the uncontrolled areas in each area of operation.¹⁷

The ANA stands ready to perform a vital supporting function in this COIN strategy. Aside from serving as an interim self-defense force and assisting Special Forces in training the constabulary police force and the village self-defense force, the ANA *kandaks* will serve as MTC elements.¹⁸ The MTC *kandaks* should operate along the seams of the controlled areas. While the constabulary police forces weed out the insurgent infrastructure, the ANA with Special Forces advisors can operate in areas such as the Afghan/Pakistan border or via dismounted operations inside of mountainous areas, denying sanctuary to insurgents hiding and operating outside of the controlled areas.

The ANA can also deny sanctuary to insurgents who gather in populated areas outside of the controlled areas via intelligence-driven clearance operations meant to keep the insurgents off balance and on the run. Each AOB should retain one A-Team at the AOB firebase to advise the ANA MTC force and stand ready with an additional ANA

Quick Reaction Force company.¹⁹ This company should stand ever vigilant to rapidly answer their comrades in need. This ready company will prove integral as the Special Forces and their indigenous allies assume the risk of decentralizing as much as possible in order to affect and control the largest area possible.

With the appropriate assets arrayed, the operations necessary to defeat the insurgency can commence. The process to “clear, hold, and build” occurs in steps, but like all asymmetric operations, Special Forces can perform steps simultaneously or even skip steps dependant upon the results of their iterative local assessment processes.²⁰ As they continually interact with the population and assess their level of control, Special Forces leaders can determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures best work for them at their given time and place.

If the SFODAs must “cold call” a new village, the team will begin an area assessment of the village and develop political, cultural, social, and economic awareness of the community and its area of influence.²¹ Next, the SFODA will make contact with the village *shura* and “meet and greet” the village elder in order to begin establishing rapport and explain that they intend to move into the village to “protect and serve” it.²² At this point the team will occupy a house in the village and should begin to clear and secure it through the



ANA Company Commander
Addressing Shura in Shinkay, Afghanistan

interim use of the ANA.²³ Any clearance operations should utilize intelligence and minimize intrusion on the population as much as possible. It should also be coupled with an intensive information operations campaign to explain why the clearance is occurring and that the counterinsurgents intend to remain in the area permanently. The Special Forces and ANA begin to then organize, train, and equip the constabulary police force and the village self-defense force.²⁴

Simultaneously, the A-Team begins to establish its “grass roots” intelligence network.²⁵ The members of the police and self-defense forces recruited from the village and immediate local area will

possess valuable knowledge of the area, which will begin to strengthen the SFODA's intelligence collection. Upon securing the village, Special Forces should begin to improve the village via pre-assessed means that lead to nuanced ends appropriate for the specific needs of the village.²⁶ These civil military operations coupled with timely information operations can further persuade the population to resist control of the coercive insurgent infrastructure and simultaneously legitimize the Government of Afghanistan.²⁷




ANA and Local Police in Shinkay, Afghanistan

The efforts to accurately assess specific needs will provide positive effects when the population sees their lives improving at the same time that they perceive the control of the insurgency slipping. These effects will reduce the time necessary to reach a point where a SFODA can transfer control over to the police and move on to a new area.

Historically, counterinsurgents have utilized color coding as measures of effectiveness.²⁸ The Frenchman David Galula utilized “red, pink, and white” areas for example.²⁹ As the SFODA commander perceives that the Special Forces and police have begun to defeat the insurgent infrastructure, he may determine that a village is “pink,” proceed to go split team, and spread his forces out to begin to control another village. As these villages become secure, the A-Team

can further spread their team dependent on the competence level of the detachment members. When the detachment commander feels that a village is prepared to stand on its own, with only its indigenous forces, he declares the village “white” and moves the detachment to an adjacent area village in order to continue spreading the control of the population. This method utilizes the “oil spot strategy” advised by Andrew Krepenivich.³⁰ As the Special Forces provide each village with the capability to protect itself and defeat the insurgent infrastructure in that village, the detachments move to geographically linked villages and the control of the population spreads from village to village like an oil spot. The following graphic depicts an AOB and SFODAs spreading an oil spot of population control.



As the controlled area grows (likely over several months or years), the insurgents will begin to substantially weaken. The reason is because they are forced away from their supply of needed resources such as new recruits, weapons, food, and money. The ANA MTC forces should continually disrupt the insurgents’ supply efforts. Unable to find sanctuary in the restricted terrain of the mountains and with their supply lines from the Pakistani tribal areas severed, the Taliban may attempt to return to the controlled villages where the indigenous police and self-defense forces can defeat them. These military and law enforcement actions, coupled with the ongoing political and economic actions of the Government of Afghanistan and its civilian

agency supporters, should defeat the Taliban and assist in stabilizing Afghanistan.

This indigenous and village-focused strategy would require a shift in the current command and control paradigm in Afghanistan. The protection of vested interests at all levels of the political and military spectrum involved in stabilizing Afghanistan would hinder the effort to execute this COIN strategy. Encouraging the Government of Afghanistan to revamp its current use of ANA, police, and Afghan Militia Forces towards a more decentralized and aggressive posture, focused on controlling the population at the village level, would receive friction from both the highest levels of the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior and perhaps President Karzai. However, the idea of actually defeating the Taliban insurgency, stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan, and bringing Afghanistan into the fold of globalized nations would be worth the effort.

After 5 years in Afghanistan, the conditions are available to defeat the insurgent Taliban and stabilize Afghanistan. The Special Forces must continue its long-term relationship with the ANA, and through understanding their strengths and weaknesses, employ them in accordance with the best practices of COIN. Special Forces and ANA must organize, train, equip, and advise local indigenous police and village self-defense forces in order to control the population at the village level. Through the use of the sound and proven COIN principles of “clear, hold, and build,” the Government of Afghanistan and its allies in the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan and Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan can secure and protect the population. Though this indigenous and village-focused strategy employs a decentralized, irregular, and asymmetric paradigm, it presents an effective means to secure, stabilize, and reconstruct Afghanistan in order to welcome it into the globalized community. ↑

Endnotes

1. This strategy can be found in classic COIN works—for example, see David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).
2. John R. Dyke and John R. Crisafulli, “Unconventional Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006).
3. Ibid.

4. Heinz Dinter—executive officer of 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne)—telephone interview by author, 9 and 16 August 2006.
5. The soldiers of 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne)—3 SFG(A)—worked by, with, and through the ANA from April-October 2002 and March-July 2003. 1st Battalion has deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF) five times to date, and similar to the rest of 3 SFG(A), has spent 35 of the past 60 months deployed in support of OEF. The soldiers of 5th Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne) advised the ANA from October 2002-March 2003.
6. The Office of Military Coordination-Afghanistan reflagged as the Office of Security Coordination-Afghanistan in 2006.
7. Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated 27 July 2006), 24.
8. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 23.
9. John R. Dyke and John R. Crisafulli, 19 and 43.
10. Andrew F. Krepinevich, 70.
11. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 107-127.
12. *Department of the Army, FM I 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 3-13.
13. Eric P. Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," *Special Warfare* 18, 2 (2005), 6-7.
14. John R. Dyke and John R. Crisafulli, 19.
15. Ibid, 21.
16. John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 128-129. See also Andrew F. Krepinevich, 70-71. Special Forces teams built an indigenous village defense system with 38,000 irregulars and secured an entire Vietnamese province.
17. Eric P. Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," *Special Warfare* 18, 2 (2005), 7.
18. John R. Dyke and John R. Crisafulli, 21.
19. Ibid, 22.
20. Eric P. Wendt, 9-12.
21. The A-Teams in each Special Forces group have various tactics, techniques, and procedures for this process and are certainly comfortable with this task.
22. The use of a police motto sets the appropriate tone for the COIN environment.
23. The ANA had mastered basic small unit COIN tasks by the spring of 2004 and began to train local police on the tasks in the Shinkay District of Zabol Province.

24. The ANA proved to be valuable indigenous militia trainers in Bamiyan Province (summer of 2003) and police trainers in the Shinkay District of Zabol Province (spring of 2004).
25. John R. Dyke and John R. Crisafulli, 30.
26. Ibid, 31.
27. Ibid, 31. Majors Dyke and Crisafulli appropriately capture the fact that this process will take months or even years to accomplish, which is the nature of the "Long War."
28. David Galula, 96-97. See also John R. Dyke and John R. Crisafulli, 32.
29. Ibid, 96-97.
30. Andrew J. Krepinevich, Jr., "How to Win in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2005); available from www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84508/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/how-to-win-in-iraq.html (accessed 19 August 2006).

Conventional Forces Intelligence Integration with Special Operations Forces in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom III

Ronald Beadenkopf

The Third Infantry Division experienced significant challenges integrating and supporting targeting and intelligence for the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community in Multinational Division, Baghdad; however, the resultant successes in intelligence sharing, fusion, targeting, and execution paid huge dividends throughout the rotation.

Intelligence-Driven Operations

Current counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq are largely driven by intelligence, due to the nature of the asymmetric threat. Intelligence dissemination at nearly all echelons and classifications is increasingly “flattening,” resulting in time-sensitive intelligence available to both conventional forces and SOF. These two forces share similar access to the same national and tactical intelligence resources. Cross-cueing of analytical assessments, target development, and sharing of knowledge is a win-win for both organizations. Due to the fleeting nature of the insurgent threat, time-sensitive targeting has become vital to successful targeting. Field Manual 3-05 “Army Special Operations Forces” states:

ARSOF intelligence requirements (IRs) are heavily mission- and situation-dependent. Because ARSOF missions may vary widely, the associated intelligence support requirements also may vary. Therefore, intelligence production for SOF requires a thorough understanding of SO [Special

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Operations] requirements at the tactical level. It presents national and theater intelligence producers with unusual production and dissemination challenges.¹

While the statements are correct, the conventional forces face nearly identical intelligence requirements in the unconventional fight and have worked hard with national and theater intelligence producers to meet collection, processing, production, and dissemination challenges.

3rd Infantry Division and SOF Integration

During Operation Iraqi Freedom III, the Third Infantry Division (3rd ID) G-2 and G-3 developed strong ties with the various SOF operating in Multinational Division, Baghdad (MND-B). The G-2 and G-3 role was based partly on necessity, due to the high levels of multinational forces (SOF and conventional forces) operating within the MND-B area of operations. The other purpose was to assist the division commander in maintaining situational awareness of all operations occurring in his area in support of planning for, preparing, and assessing the effects of all operations. During this time, the division juggled a number of strategic and international events, such as the ratification of the Iraqi Constitution, the first elections for the Transitional National Assembly, and the start of the Saddam Hussein trials. In addition, thousands of fledgling Iraqi government officials and workers and dozens of embassies in and around the Green Zone had security concerns. A variety of SOF, conventional forces, multinational forces, and contractors were responsible for the security of these sites, which included analysis and interdiction of many threats.

Joint, Interagency SOF Coordination

Baghdad in 2005 was an alphabet soup of host nation, conventional forces, SOF, and multinational nongovernmental organizations. All of those agencies had their own security concerns, due to Al Qaeda in Iraq and a multitude of identified and unidentified threat organizations that were able to maintain a sustained level of violence during the 3rd ID rotation. It was a natural step for the various conventional forces, SOF, and national agencies to begin close collaboration on intelligence sharing, target development, and indications and

warning that was to pay enormous dividends during events of critical importance to the future of Iraq.

Two of the critical areas that SOF, conventional forces, and the Coalition Provisional Authority collaborated on were indications and warning and actionable, time-sensitive intelligence. In an environment where operations were driven primarily by intelligence, actionable intelligence was the coin of the realm. Major concerns in MND-B were indications of threat planning for spectacular or media-drawing events, in parallel with significant threats of kidnappings and attacks against host-nation government and other foreign government officials. While the brigade combat teams assigned to MND-B focused primarily on the threats within their sectors of Baghdad, the division addressed key insurgent leadership and cross-boundary operators. This threat group consisted of regionally or nationally based insurgent groups moving freely through the division area of operations, threatening the security of political players and events as well as the force protection of the International Zone, the various Forward Operating Bases in MND-B, and the Baghdad International Airport base complex.

SOF Liaison Officer

The 3rd ID SOF liaison officer of the G-3 operations cell was notified when actionable intelligence identified cross-boundary or other fleeting targets that could not be acted on by conventional forces. Although this officer's mission was to serve as subject matter expert and liaison for SOF, he primarily deconflicted operations between SOF and conventional forces in the 3rd ID battlespace. The true intelligence coordination occurred with constant communication between the intelligence and targeting cells of the 3rd ID G-2 and the various SOF elements in the division battlespace. The intelligence and targeting cells maintained the true pulse of which insurgent targets and cells were of highest interest to which SOF element. Operational flexibility of SOF also meant that they could execute multiple iterations of the targeting cycle while an infantry unit planned one cordon and search operation; therefore, the SOF liaison officer, targeting, and intel cells worked together to maintain situational awareness regarding targets of opportunity.

Time-Sensitive Targeting

Time-sensitive targeting results from near-real time, actionable intelligence fused from single or multiple sources to identify a lucrative, fleeting target that can then be acted on in a timely manner. The fleeting nature of the insurgent target in MND-B guaranteed that actionable intelligence had a limited time of value; the longer it took to act on the intelligence, the higher the probability it would no longer be valid. The 3rd ID came to grips with the challenges of target development and executing against actionable intelligence. They learned one of the realities of full spectrum operations: conventional forces face multiple, competing requirements and responsibilities such as force protection and civil-military operations that reduce the number of units on the ground available to conduct time-sensitive targeting operations. Based on the nature of ongoing operations and responsibility for the area of operations, conventional forces may not be able to focus in a timely manner. The timeliness involves focusing on an area or entity identified as actionable in order to take advantage of a fleeting target. This challenge is where a strong relationship with SOF operating in the unit battlespace paid huge dividends.

Intelligence Integration Vignette

The SOF operating in the 3rd ID battlespace were by nature much smaller and more flattened organizations than conventional forces and better postured to conduct time-sensitive targeting operations, especially across sector and unit boundaries. Their intelligence analysis cells were sometimes smaller than their conventional forces counterparts and had to prioritize their analytical and target development focus more carefully. Although SOF in Iraq operated almost exclusively within the battlespace of a conventional forces unit, their efforts were often focused against different activities conducted by the same insurgent elements within that battlespace. A good example might be an insurgent group conducting kidnapping and car-jacking in the suburbs of Baghdad and exfiltrating to a safe haven in Fallujah. Due to the nature of their operations, the insurgents may be unknown to the unit controlling the battlespace in Fallujah, but the unit controlling Baghdad may know their exfiltration routes. When a division intelligence analyst put the pieces of the puzzle together and realized that he had actionable intelligence of a time-

sensitive nature, the division targeting officer had to have the ability to “farm out” the developed target package to the organization best postured to act on it. Based on this scenario, a SOF element was often best postured to act on this threat, due in part to the challenges many units have coordinating with other conventional units on cross-boundary targets.

As shown by this example, intelligence sharing and target development and deconfliction at all echelons was not a luxury, but a necessity. Conventional forces and SOF were often focused on different activities in the same battlespace; however, the intelligence invariably led back to a common intelligence thread. Deconfliction of targets and intelligence was critical in supporting unity of effort for 3rd ID and ensured that ongoing target development was not jeopardized.

Division Targeting Meetings

In 2005 the 3rd ID achieved significant success in its targeting efforts through coordination and deconfliction of targets and intelligence through weekly targeting meetings. The meetings were designed to capture the daily informal communication between units and provide a regular forum for all units operating in the division battlespace to deconflict and coordinate targets. The targeting meeting allowed SOF, conventional forces, other agencies, and subordinate units to review and deconflict target lists and priorities.

The targeting meeting was a means for managing the fluid, fast-paced nature of the contemporary operating environment and the reality that multiple agencies, organizations, and elements might be gathering intelligence on the same target. The meetings were an excellent opportunity for units to offer insight into linkages, intent, and tactics, techniques, and procedures of various groups. The dialogue included assessments of emerging threats, in essence reordering threat target lists on the spot based on degree of significance. Communication often revealed that one organization had already captured or was in the final stages of preparing to conduct an operation against an individual, cell, or network on the planning calendar of another.

Targeting Meeting Agenda and Attendees

The 3rd ID targeting meetings, chaired by the division G-2, consisted of representatives from the various brigades, corps, as well as SOF elements represented in the division battlespace. The targeting officer of each element briefed current, prioritized target lists; discussed operations conducted against specific targets over the previous week; then covered upcoming operations. Representatives requested information from the audience on various targets, while deconflicting targets and battlespace and offering analysis on emerging or mature targets operating across boundaries. The intelligence sections briefed ongoing analysis and emerging threats where Human Intelligence (HUMINT) sources, interrogations or Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) reporting had provided leads or actionable intelligence. A critical aspect of the targeting meetings was providing situational awareness to all organizations of other unit priorities and focusing on the activities within the 3rd ID area of operations as a whole as well as targeted individuals and groups.

Teams responsible for countering improvised explosive devices and other specialized elements attended the meetings to gather information on enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures and activities observed by the intelligence analysts and targeting cells. Most importantly, targeting meetings offered the opportunity to develop working relationships between conventional forces and SOF that furthered intelligence, target sharing, and target deconfliction.

Coordination between SOF and Conventional Forces Intelligence Cells

The second area of emphasis in coordination and integration was between intelligence elements. Due to the intensive nature of time-sensitive intelligence analysis and target development, all organizations had to prioritize their analysis and target development efforts. Maintaining constant communication at all echelons prevented redundancy and assisted intelligence cells in focusing their unit's priority of effort while maximizing secondary and tertiary efforts from SOF. Working closely with the division, the SOF elements maintained daily contact and provided feedback on operations.

SOF elements working closely with 3rd ID G-2 were able to leverage the conventional forces operational focus in insurgent

strongholds. They coordinated simultaneous or concurrent operations against networks or leaders that operated across boundaries. Although many of the relationships developed between conventional forces and SOF were personality driven, this paper emphasizes the dividends and payoffs possible when the conventional forces/SOF relationship for targeting and analysis purposes is cultivated at the division level.

Target Collaboration and Deconfliction

The division experienced significant success in collaborating with SOF on emerging targets operating in the gaps, seams, and cross-boundary areas by leveraging SOF flexibility and its rapid response capability against cross-boundary targets. Additionally, SOF targeting capabilities and expertise often exceeded conventional forces; 3rd ID was still learning to conduct time-sensitive targeting operations in a COIN environment, and SOF had the capability to maintain the element of surprise with a smaller footprint.

SOF and conventional forces cooperation continued to support time-sensitive targeting operations, through division G-2 support of sensitive site exploitation and follow-on operations. In many instances, SOF time-sensitive targeting operations resulted in the capture of division or brigade targets that SOF elements did not have the time or interest in processing. The division processed and interrogated these targets to further operational goals and answer division information requirements.

Recommendations

Collaboration between SOF and conventional forces is critical to tactical success and can be the catalyst to achieving operational goals through neutralizing insurgent networks. The challenge remains in not only gaining these working relationships but also maintaining them through the Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority process. SOF units tend to rotate through the theater much more quickly than conventional forces, and personality-driven relationships can dry up very quickly if not maintained through hard work and a genuine desire to cooperate. With that in mind, the informal relationships between SOF and conventional forces targeting analysis and targeting elements can be of great value. A key time for developing these

relationships is prior to and during the predeployment and deployment process, with the liaison officers leading the way.

The power of the division intelligence organization lies in the analytical power and all-source fusion capability of the Analysis and Control Element (ACE). With the special intelligence gained by SOF units, the ACE can develop more complete analytical products that are of use to both elements. Additionally, formalizing a division-level structure of intelligence liaison officers would add greatly to the seamless integration of actionable intelligence. The structure would support intelligence collaboration between SOF, host nation, and other government agencies; and the structure in the SOF elements would be similar. Lastly, refining the procedures and lessons learned will assist future commanders in developing and integrating SOF and conventional forces. The refinement involves going from SOF and conventional forces intelligence collaboration and analysis to doctrine that supports synchronized and coordinated operations inside the conventional forces battlespace. ↑

Endnote

The author thanks COL Robert Taylor, former 3rd ID G-2 and CPT Stephen Koch, former 3rd ID officer-in-charge of the HUMINT Analysis and Requirements Cell for their feedback on this paper.

1. FM 3-05 (FM 100-25) Army Special Operations Forces, 20 September 2006, chapter 7-3.

Educating Broadly: Rethinking Nontraditional Special Operations Forces Education

Guillaume N. Beaurpere

The complexity of the contemporary operational environment requires that Special Operations Forces (SOF) be educated broadly to effectively shape the future force. SOF needs a comprehensive, nontraditional education program to bridge the gap between foreign cultures and between interagency and military cultures. Many prospects already exist outside the confines of the Department of Defense. It is only a question of how to gain access and provide these unique opportunities to SOF warriors.

Introduction

Professional military education was clearly a major player in the process of innovation in the interwar period [1920s and 1930s]; it will probably be even more important in the future, but only if it provides the broad conceptual framework that innovation requires.¹

The National Military Strategy designates the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as the supported command for planning and synchronizing the war on terrorism. As the missions of SOF become more complex and operators are asked to perform increasingly sensitive and strategically important tasks on a global scale, the education of SOF leaders must be prioritized to effectively shape the future force. The question is how innovative is SOF willing to be and how much risk is it prepared to assume when it comes to educating future leaders while actively

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fighting the “long war” against terrorism? USSOCOM and the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) are proposing an ambitious initiative with such broad proposals as the establishment of “a process for Joint SOF human capital development” and developing “a Joint SOF ‘cradle to grave’ career management system.”² These initiatives are still in their infancy and require further thought and development. This paper will build on this fledgling education concept by discussing the challenges impeding the joint community’s ability to educate imaginative and innovative leaders, build a generic model for SOF nontraditional education, and provide recommendations for the way ahead.

SOF need a nontraditional education program that reaches beyond the restrictive confines of the Department of Defense (DoD). With this thought, this paper proposes incorporating greater “social intelligence” into SOF education programs.³ We need to not only bridge the gap between foreign cultures but also between our own political, civilian interagency and military cultures. Beyond the ability to interact with people, the proposal implies that SOF leaders must gain a deeper understanding of both interagency institutional culture and foreign cultural thought and problem solving to effectively operate at the operational and strategic levels.

Challenges to Broadening SOF Education

The current parameters for joint education and training are too restrictive to achieve true innovation. In today’s contemporary operational environment, enhancing the knowledge of the science and art of war must reach well beyond the realm of conventional military thought. The education of SOF leaders can no longer be considered a DoD centric responsibility. SOF must broaden its horizons and redefine SOF education as well as overcome debilitating challenges and fallacies in current trends.

Education challenges today range from extremely high operations tempo to intense mission focus in very specific regions of the world. Most SOF operators who redeploy from Iraq or Afghanistan almost immediately re-enter a training cycle for deployment back to the same theater. Although this practice is building a depth of expertise within the force on two areas of operation, it is also diverting SOF assets from potential conflict areas in the rest of the world.

This challenge affects the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review vision of building a SOF capacity to operate in “dozens of countries simultaneously...have an increased ability to work with partners, surrogates... [and] increasing regional proficiency.”⁴ The persistent deployment cycle is also taxing the force to the breaking point and may in due time cause retention and readiness issues that we must address now. The issue of family stability is likely to increasingly debilitate the force as SOF leaders and operators decide to leave the service simply to spend more time at home with their families.

When not deployed, special operators have no effective mechanism to nurture or capitalize on their hard-earned cultural intelligence and interagency skills acquired during deployment. SOF likes to advertise that it maintains a skill set in cultural awareness, a concept that the conventional force is struggling to embrace, yet SOF has not evolved beyond the training concepts of cultural awareness through initial-entry education such as the Special Forces Qualification course and in predeployment training or very rudimentary language training. Although basic foreign language proficiency can be trained in the classroom, to be truly effective it should be complemented with broader language education opportunities outside the confines of the DoD. Instead, SOF sets low and impractical standards for its leaders and operators. A minimum score of 1/1 (reading/listening) out of a maximum 3/3 on the Defense Language Proficiency Test provides the SOF warrior with just enough to “break the ice” but not much more linguistic, social, or cultural depth. This low standard only reinforces such bad habits as reliance on technology for translation, which is impersonal and lacks cultural context.⁵ No substitute exists for learning a foreign language in the real intimacy of its native setting.

Army SOF is implementing adaptive thinking models in its initial entry training and scenario-based exercises. The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) explains the importance of learning adaptability as “the need to experience a wide range of training events with frequently shifting tasks and conditions so that the learner is routinely forced to adapt to new situations and is never allowed to get comfortable in any given set of tasks.”⁶ The goal is to produce SOF with the intuition to recognize a variety of patterns that would be useful in a broad range of unpredictable situations. Yet, IDA recommendations are exclusively based on building a training

environment; they do not address broader education possibilities in developing adaptability. The thought that standard education and training can replicate most situations SOF leaders may experience on the battlefield is a fallacy. Although scenario-based simulations or exercises develop mental adaptability, it is only through continuous exposure to how other institutions and societies think and gaining expanded knowledge of the operational and strategic system that we can effectively build globally adaptable thinkers.

SOF leaders are increasingly moving into joint/interagency positions and asked to operate and think critically at levels that they have not experienced before, yet no effective support exists in current professional military education (PME) and training. SOF leaders suggest that joint, interagency, and multinational education must be available earlier in their careers and timed to precede critical assignments. The problem is that such education opportunities are too often handicapped or restricted by other service-directed PME requirements.⁷ Another fallacy is in noncommissioned officer (NCO) versus officer education, where officers are congressionally legislated for PME while NCOs and warrant officers (WOs) are not. When queried about nontraditional education opportunities for NCOs, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel at Department of the Army automatically defaults to officer accession programs. In the Army the vast majority of training with industry opportunities or advanced civil schooling programs is only open to officers. SOF NCOs and WOs are expected to work in environments that require much broader educational backgrounds than is currently available through the services. SOF must challenge the illogical restrictions for PME of enlisted SOF personnel in order to achieve greater access to nontraditional education that will allow all SOF leaders to better think operationally and strategically.

The military establishment has institutionalized a mindset that does not lend itself to adaptive thought and understanding how other societies perceive reality. In fact, JSOU recently published findings emphasizing that “neither command nor Service nor joint PME institutions and programs are sufficiently preparing mid- and senior-level SOF leaders...for the operational or strategic challenges of the GWOT.”⁸ While we must provide opportunities for SOF leaders and thinkers to step out of their comfort zones, it is becoming increasingly difficult to accomplish within the continental United States.

SOF lack effective systems that can build divergent thought and increased cultural and linguistic knowledge within the organization.

Building a Model for SOF Nontraditional Education

Imagine the possibilities of redefining SOF persistent presence as inclusive of nontraditional SOF language and academic education opportunities overseas. Through nontraditional education, SOF leaders can develop unique perspectives on problem solving through first-hand experience with other agencies or multinational institutions. Scott Swanson argues from a human intelligence (HUMINT) perspective that the key to SOF information collection is to demonstrate social and cultural understanding well in advance of employment. “SOF elements need to re-embrace a mindset of a “social/political advisor” or develop additional tradecraft and deeper cultural insights to obtain the necessary information from locals.”⁹

The endstate of a nontraditional SOF education program is SOF leaders with an expanded worldview that are better able to produce creative solutions to complex problems at the operational and strategic levels. This goal is perfectly nested within SOF education concepts that USSOCOM is developing. JSOU developed the Joint SOF Leadership Competency Model as a complement to the limitation of the armed services career-development profiles. The joint vision for the SOF warrior is an operator that is proficient in interagency and international relationships and increasingly capable of operating for extended periods of time in diverse regions of the world.¹⁰ The theory is that a balanced SOF education in all six competency clusters of the JSOU model results in a leader that is comfortable with operating at all three levels of war while handling uncertain situations and environments.¹¹

A SOF education model can support the six components of the leadership competency model through a 2-year fellowship education program based on academics and immersion opportunities. It would be run much like the Olmsted Scholarship program that already exists for mid-level career officers.¹² Once assessed into a SOF career track, the operator would fall under USSOCOM oversight for professional education. Select nontraditional education programs would exist within the services’ Chief of Staff offices for personnel since they ultimately control career tracks and promotions. The Olmsted

program, for example, is managed by each service individually based on slots available but is open to officers from all four services.

From the user level, the education programs would look like scholarship or fellowship opportunities for mid- to senior-level SOF career track NCOs, WOs, and officers.¹³ A SOF leader would be recommended by the chain of command through USSOCOM and compete within his or her service for specific scholarships or fellowships based on his or her academic strengths, SOF specialty, and possible future assignments. The 2-year sabbatical program of education would consist of the following elements:

- a. Enrollment at a U.S. or foreign university
- b. Summer internship program with the interagency or an international organization if studying overseas
- c. Forging lifelong personal and professional relationships
- d. Submitting a written paper to JSOU for publication based on SOF leader experiences (akin to a thesis)
- e. Joint/multinational utilization tour following the period of study.

The key to implementing a successful nontraditional education program is to make it low threat and to emphasize the intangible rewards of a SOF scholarship. Degree completion should not have to be a program requirement. In the case of the Olmsted Scholarship, completing a master's degree at a foreign university is not always feasible nor is it required. Rather the main objective is the cultural immersion, regional familiarization, and foreign language education. In 2 years at a U.S. university, a dedicated NCO or WO could complete an associate's degree or accumulate credits for promotion points, accession into an officer program, or pursuing a bachelor's degree after his or her Army career. Consider that the Army is bringing in substantially more mature operators through its 18X program (Special Forces Initial Accessions), many of which may have already earned college credit or even full degrees outside the military. Opportunities to continue their education through SOF may have recruiting appeal and build a base of potential candidates for nontraditional options. Mid-level officers applying for SOF scholarships should see the value of an advanced degree, and most should be able to complete a master's in 2 years. The idea is that exposure to different ways of thinking and analyzing problems and the time spent

interacting with other agencies or institutions will broaden the worldview of the SOF leader and better prepare him or her for operational and strategic level work.

A scholarship based in the continental U.S. would be primarily focused on the interagency and would require an internship with specific governmental agencies. The concept involves enrollment at a U.S. university and following a program of study specific to a particular U.S. governmental agency (i.e., a Department of State program might revolve around study of political science, international relations, and foreign language). During the summer and winter breaks, the SOF leader would integrate the interagency as an intern rather than as a SOF liaison officer. Depending on the program, the internship could also be conducted overseas in an embassy or even a nongovernmental organization. The student internship option allows for greater assimilation of interagency culture, presents a nonthreatening professional disposition as a student versus a soldier, and provides first-hand exposure to techniques and procedures, which can pay huge dividends in follow-on joint/interagency assignments. The personal and professional relationships that are built during the 2 years of education should be nurtured to facilitate future collaboration on common objectives and goals. In today's operational environment it is likely that the SOF leader would run into these same interagency players again in the course of a special operations career.

An overseas scholarship would require application and acceptance at a foreign university or academic institution. The SOF scholar would actually be expected to use part of the scholarship grant on foreign travel and area familiarization. This aspect has tremendous application for SOF leaders in developing greater situational awareness of the contemporary operational environment. Through a foreign study scholarship the SOF leader will benefit from informal interaction with fellow classmates who may become future leaders of that nation. Self awareness becomes critical in such situations. A personal example occurred during my Olmsted experience when challenged by a Muslim colleague about the inconsistencies of Christianity based on the virtues of Islam. This deep cultural aspect of a foreign-based nontraditional educational immersion has vast implications in areas such as understanding enemy thought processes, working with host nation counterparts, advising foreign mid- and

senior-level leaders on combat operations, and improving foreign language capabilities.

As an alternative to foreign academia, SOF could expand the program into NCO or officer fellowships for 2-year instructor assignments at allied military schools. Such programs already exist, but giving it the *fellowship* title implies some level of self study and provides a unique incentive to use some of the money for travel and broader area familiarization.” In addition, interaction with the U.S. embassy and the country team (which is implied while overseas) can serve to facilitate future SOF integration with the Department of State. Once again, a SOF leader integrated as a student presents a much more benign footprint to the U.S. ambassador than an official SOF liaison officer.

One important dimension of a SOF scholarship program is the sabbatical aspect that would allow a SOF leader and his or her family to take time away from extremely demanding and fast-paced deployment cycles and reflect on the profession of arms. In the long run, this dimension can help address emerging retention issues by offering 2 years of guaranteed refit for the SOF member and family. The college education piece should also serve as an incentive—that is, a master’s degree for officers or associate’s degree for NCOs or WOs. Many U.S. and foreign universities welcome the presence of military leaders as full-time students and usually regard them as complimentary to academic debate and dialogue. SOF can exploit such nontraditional academic opportunities as a way to tell the military story and build public understanding, foreign or domestic, for the mission of the U.S. armed forces. Such a broad program could also serve as a recruiting tool for civilian students interested in a military career and even attract conventional service members who seek greater nontraditional opportunities from their military service.

Recommendations for the Way Ahead

The base concept for SOF nontraditional education calls for a 2-year course of study at a foreign or a U.S. university focusing either on foreign language and cultural immersion or strategy and interagency internships. SOF is then only limited by its enduring challenges to nontraditional education and its own institutional willingness to

accept the risk of losing SOF leaders for 2 years of education. Recommendations would include the following:

- a. As a mechanism to meet Quadrennial Defense Review requirements, redefine the parameters of SOF “persistent presence” through the implementation of a broad nontraditional education program. SOF scholarships or fellowships can persistently implant leaders in regions, countries, or institutions through education. SOF should seek academic access on the periphery of conflict regions in permissive environments. In the Arab world, for example, countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates are accessible for DoD personnel and therefore for nontraditional education.
- b. Mobilize the armed services to seek congressional exception for PME of SOF NCOs and WOs as well as officers. In developing operational and strategic thinkers within SOF, we must accept that all leaders need exposure to external education and knowledge. In the long run this acceptance will exponentially increase human dividends back to SOF.
- c. Engage private organizations, such as the Olmsted Foundation, on behalf of USSOCOM, to explore possibilities of extending education opportunities for SOF leaders. DoD money could pay for extending such programs. In particular, the Olmsted Foundation may also be willing to consider highly qualified WOs from within the SOF community.
- d. Exploit SOF language capabilities by promoting participation in overseas education programs. Several existing scholarship programs require foreign language capability. One option that the Army is experimenting with is the Fulbright Scholarship program. In 2006 two junior officers were commissioned out of the U.S. Military Academy to study abroad.
- e. USSOCOM and JSOU can engage the Fulbright Commission by emphasizing a holistic and strategic vision for possible SOF leader participation, thus expanding on current Department of the Army initiatives.
- f. Explore and develop existing programs with the interagency. The U.S. government does a great job of reaching out to college students for internships and often provides scholarship money to help pay for tuition as a recruiting tool. Consider

inserting SOF warriors into these diverse education opportunities as graduate and undergraduate students. Existing programs could be developed as SOF scholarships and funded by DoD. Table 1 has some examples.

Table 1. Existing interagency Scholarship Programs and Possible Application to SOF Model

| Potential SOF Study | Target SOF Leaders | Dividends for SOF | Proposed Utility Tours |
|--|--|--|---------------------------------|
| Fulbright Scholarship (through DoS Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs) | Mid-level officers WOs | Language education Heavy cultural immersion Independent study program Foreign contacts DoS interaction | TSOC CJSOTF JIATF MLE |
| CIA Undergrad Scholarship or co-op programs (requires at least a summer internship within CIA) | WOs Mid-level NCOs | Interagency operations Intel analysis and fusion Targeting methodology | TSOC/ GCC JIATF JSOTF |
| FBI Middle Eastern Foreign Language Honors Internship Program | Mid-level officers WOs Mid-level NCOs | Interagency operations Security, tactics, techniques, and procedures Intel analysis and fusion | JIATF TSOC/ GCC CJSOTF |
| DoS Fасcell Fellowship (works in U.S. embassy overseas, focused on China and Eastern Europe) | WOs Mid-level NCOs | Interagency operations Public diplomacy Regional orientation Language immersion | MLE TSOC |
| NSA Analysis Training Program (ATP) | WOs Mid-level NCOs | Intel analysis and fusion Targeting methodology | CJSOTF JIATF |
| NSA Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program (PRISP) | Mid-level officers WOs Mid-level NCOs | Intel analysis and fusion Targeting methodology Foreign language application | TSOC/ GCC JIATF CJSOTF |

| Potential SOF Study | Target SOF Leaders | Dividends for SOF | Proposed Utility Tours |
|--|--|---|------------------------|
| DoD National Education Program (NEP) (1 year of undergraduate study abroad) | Mid-level NCOs | Language education Foreign cultural immersion Foreign contacts DoS interaction | MLE CJSOTF |
| CJSOTF | Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force | | |
| DoS | Department of State | | |
| GCC | Geographical Combatant Command | | |
| JIATF | Joint Interagency Task Force | | |
| MLE | Military Liaison Element | | |
| NSA | National Security Agency | | |
| TSOC | Theater Special Operations Command | | |

- g. Assign coordination and advertising responsibilities of non-traditional SOF education to the JSOU J1 under the Chief of Staff and link this office to each of the service personnel offices. USSOCOM J7 would vet SOF leader applicants, and the services would manage the actual scholarships under SOF career track programs. Much the same way as the Enlisted or Officer Branch in the Army manages civil schooling programs for specific specialties, the services would also manage SOF scholarships, fellowships, and training with interagency for SOF personnel. The key is that SOF scholarships must be nested within the services' internal professional development programs.
- h. Once established, advertise the nontraditional education program across the force and in recruiting. This action implies that we must evolve towards a leadership cultural change where currently the proverbial "good deals" are not legitimate for SOF leaders and their professional development. Time to reflect and regenerate is critical to retention and to sustain a SOF culture that constantly evaluates and recommends changes to the force.
- i. Bring the National Guard and Reserve SOF into the fold of nontraditional education. SOF scholarships could be made available following a Reserve call-up or deployment where the

SOF leader may be in between civilian jobs. The implementation of this option would be difficult, but we should not discount the possibilities.

Conclusion

SOF leaders must be adaptive thinkers. One way to develop adaptive thought is by increasing opportunities for exposure to vastly different environments—for example, in a foreign country or other governmental agency where military thought does not dominate. We can accomplish this objective with a broad nontraditional education program. Many prospects already exist outside the confines of the DoD and could be immediately developed. It is only a question of how to gain access and provide these once-in-a-lifetime opportunities to SOF leaders with their unique skills and willingness to learn and think differently.

Some concerns about a 2-year hiatus include the inability to complete an undergraduate degree for NCOs or WOs and the continuously high operational tempo that makes commanders reluctant to release key personnel in wartime. Yet as we cycle greater amounts of SOF leaders into nontraditional education programs, they will develop a broader understanding of SOF asset and resource management. A long-term objective would be the saturation of SOF institutions with leaders that understand, value, and promote SOF scholarships as complimentary to JSOU-centric professional development options. Leaders educated broadly may better recognize the need for balanced resource allocation between internal and external education opportunities. SOF scholarships can provide the self-development and life-long professional education while JSOU and SOF components continue to provide operational experience and sophisticated education and training. ↑

Endnotes

The author thanks Boyd Ballard (J-7, USSOCOM) for his assistance in the development of this paper.

1. Williamson Murray, "Innovation: Past and Future" in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (editors), *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 325.
2. USSOCOM, *Capstone Concept for Special Operations* (2006), 14.

3. The term *social intelligence* is used to describe an education concept that seeks to bridge cultures through an understanding of the reasons and causes of why humans from particular social systems act the way they do.
4. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington DC, 6 February 2006, 43-44.
5. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is exploiting voice recognition technology for language translation capabilities, and the majority of national language-training resources (i.e., Defense Language Institute) remain based on classroom or instructor-led training. See JSOU, *Educational Requirements Analysis for Academic Years 2005-2010*, ES-9; also U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO), *Military Training: Strategic Planning and Distributive Learning Could Benefit the Special Operations Forces Foreign Language Program*, GAO-03-1026 Report to Congressional Committees (September 2003), 3.
6. In the scope of asymmetric threats, IDA recommends creating even more opportunities for “adaptability-learning.” John C. F. Tillson, et al., *Learning to Adapt to Asymmetric Threats* (Alexandria, VA: IDA, 2005), 35.
7. JSOU, *Strategic Plan Academic Years 2006-2013* (May 2006), 11.
8. JSOU, *Educational Requirements Analysis for Academic Years 2005-2010*, Executive Summary (VA: Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., 8 June 2005), ES-2.
9. Scott Swanson, “SOF HUMINT Collection: Knowing the Enemy and the Tradecraft,” *S400 SOF Advanced Studies Selected Readings*, U.S. Command and General Staff College (5 October 2006), S443RC-2.
10. USSOCOM, *Capstone Concept for Special Operations*, 14.
11. The core competencies of the JSOU leadership competency model are force application, force management, interpersonal orientation, action orientation, developing partnerships, and vision and strategy. See USSOCOM, *Capstone Concept for Special Operations* (2006).
12. The primary purpose of the Olmsted is to educate leaders broadly. The program consists of 1 year of language study followed by 2 years of overseas study at a foreign university.
13. USSOCOM defines “SOF leader” as NCOs E-7 to E-9, WOs CW3 to CW5, and officers O-3 to O-10.

International Crisis Information Network

Basil J. Catanzaro and Brian S. Horine

Historically, civilian-military agencies have often worked in the same areas on overlapping projects, yet exist separately. Their stereotypical misperceptions of each other have resulted in a breakdown of communication, duplication of effort, and failure to absorb lessons learned. The International Crisis Information Network site (www.crisisinfonetwork.org) is a prototype solution.

In the last few decades, the U.S. military, nongovernmental agencies, and international organizations have operated in the same locations, conducting similar types of operations, and have sometimes helped each another to accomplish their respective missions. Despite these efforts, however, they have developed walls that not only separate but often degrade their capability. If these communities continue to operate with this separation, they will struggle and falter as they attempt to meet the needs of local populations and accomplish their missions. However, if these communities work together and cooperate by sharing information, techniques, insights, problems solved, and resources, they cannot help but improve their performance.

Historically, a separation between U.S. military and outside agencies has existed. These communities have misconceptions, biases, and stereotypical misperceptions of each other. These effects have degraded the ability of the military to stabilize, transition, and reconstruct operations. This paper will explore the rift between military, nongovernmental agencies, and international organizations because it is imperative that they cooperate with each other. In doing so, they will be able to improve security and stability in countries that have been ravaged by natural and man-made disasters. Many in the

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international community recognize the need and have affirmed the desire to cooperate.

We propose that information sharing and collaboration on lessons learned can be accomplished through a Web-based network. This paper will discuss how to implement the network; highlight its specific design, concepts, and components; and focus on what throughputs are required to provide the user with the requisite information.

The purpose of this paper is to answer the question, How can we develop a system dedicated to the sharing of lessons learned between the military, governmental and nongovernmental agencies, and international organizations? The intent is to develop a prototype Web site or “beta model” to test the theory; the specific goals follow:

- a. Establish a network that will allow the military and civilian organizations to meet in cyberspace and thereby break down the cultural and stereotypical barriers that exist between them.
- b. Collaborate on lessons learned from operations in the civilian sector and areas in conflict.
- c. Empower individuals from the military and nongovernmental agencies/civilian community to conduct effective humanitarian operations in a cooperative manner.

Information sharing between these communities has been a heated topic for many years. As such, this paper addresses the following questions:

- a. How can a Web site bridge the gap between the military and other agencies?
- b. How has this separation inhibited operations or caused a duplication of effort?
- c. Can we develop a system by which Civil Affairs soldiers and the international community share lessons learned and collaborate on humanitarian missions?
- d. Who will maintain the site (e.g., update information and monitor discussion groups)?
- e. Who will fund the site (e.g., pay for workers and server space).

Studying the Rift

The relationship between the military and numerous nongovernmental agencies and international organizations has a varied history. First, many nongovernmental agencies and international organizations are relatively young compared to the military. Second, the face of conflict has changed quite drastically over the decades, often forcing these communities into shared missions and locations.

Wars and conflicts have transformed in intensity, type, and involvement over the decades. The American Civil War and World War I were high intensity, conventional wars. Battles were fought on clearly defined battlefields, which may or may not have been in a village or city, and civilians either were moved or became victims. The belligerents were conventional military forces. Civilians, in many cases, were an afterthought. Additionally, the belligerents had altered their tactics and thereby had drawn civilians into active warfare. In the past, armies mostly fought armies. While civilians were often injured as a result of collateral damage, or were located in or near a factory that was considered a strategic objective, they were essentially ignored. As wars have progressed, though, civilians are more frequently becoming the specific target of terrorists and insurgents.

Since World War I, the conduct of war has changed. The United Nations was established in 1945. Conflicts have become frequent, although in some cases less intense. New missions have entered into our lexicon like low intensity conflict and peacekeeping missions. With these new operations and the emergence of more and more nongovernmental agencies and international organizations, the world has become a bit more crowded. Also noteworthy is that the type of relationship between these communities depends on the type of operations in which they are involved. In benign missions, like providing assistance during a natural disaster (e.g., tsunami in Indonesia or earthquake in Pakistan), relationships tend to be quite cooperative.

Sometimes when information sharing occurs between these communities, the military has not always been completely fair. Operation Enduring Freedom was a watershed event for cooperation between the military and humanitarian organizations. However, it was also fraught with many problems. While the Central Command established liaison billets for international organizations and nongovernmental agencies, the information flow seemed to go one way.

Surprisingly, a large cause of the separation between the military and nongovernmental agencies comes down to the simple use of words, or semantics. Much debate has occurred over the use of the term “humanitarian” in the U.S. military’s doctrine and vernacular. The bottom line to all causes of separation is that the gap effects operations. What often happens is that the military and nongovernmental agencies enter into operations midstream, ill prepared, and incapable of properly completing their mission. They may have avoided this situation by simply meeting to share information.

The military has deployed into theaters of operations, and yet its forces have failed to perform to their fullest potential due to ignorance of local customs, beliefs, and traditions. Because military personnel often deploy to areas on short notice and for a limited time, they stand to benefit greatly from nongovernmental agencies and international organizations already established there. Many of these humanitarian organizations work overseas for years at a time, and their representatives become regional experts. They are an excellent source for information on local customs and tribal organizations or hierarchies without compromising their partiality.

Closing the Gap

Since the end of the Cold War, the military, governmental and nongovernmental agencies, and international organizations have worked together with an increased frequency and in more hostile and austere environments. Part of the cause for the converging areas of operations between nongovernmental agencies and the military is that the number of nongovernmental agencies has grown exponentially over the years.

The attacks on September 11, 2001 initiated a new era of conflict, which also provided new opportunities for nongovernmental agencies, international organizations, and militaries to work together. Nongovernmental agencies and international organizations have had a long history of work in Afghanistan. However, when the Taliban usurped control of the country, they cracked down on nongovernmental agencies’ activities. Once the U.S.-led coalition, along with the Northern Alliance, wrested control of the central government away from the Taliban, nongovernmental agencies and international organizations experienced more freedom to operate.

In the future, these communities will continue to work more frequently together and rely on each other for mutual support to stabilize, transition, and reconstruct. Consequently, it is important that they develop methods and systems to work more efficiently with each other. One step that the U.S. administration has taken since the commencement of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is to publish two documents that have revolutionized military doctrine:

- a. DoD Directive (DODD) 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations" (28 November 2005)
- b. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization" (7 December 2005).

DODD 3000.05 essentially puts stabilization, transition, and reconstruction on par with combat operations. The directive states, "Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations." Similarly, NSPD 44 outlines the job description of the position mentioned in 3000.05 as being responsible for "Develop[ing] strategies to build partnership security capacity abroad and seek to maximize nongovernmental and international resources for reconstruction and stabilization activities." In response to these directives, some nongovernmental agencies have begun to express their interest in cooperating and sharing information.

Sharing Information is Problematic

Military sharing of information with the civilian sector is problematic. The main issue is that the military conducts all Web-based business on one of three portals:

- a. Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network for unclassified but official use
- b. Secure Internet Protocol Router Network for Secret message traffic
- c. Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System for Top Secret message traffic.

Because all of these portals are closed within the DoD, they cannot interact with the civilian sector.

Another issue arises from the nongovernmental agencies and international organization communities. Through much of our research, the civilian actors have emphasized repeatedly that if such a system is created, the civilian sector will not participate if it is on a government-run site. Basically, if the Web site URL contains “.gov” or “.mil” in the address, the nongovernmental agencies and international organizations will not utilize it. Therefore, we recommend the creation of a Web-based network independent of any military or governmental organization.

Considering the International Crisis Information Network (ICIN)

Before pursuing the network, we asked the question, Does the Web already have such a site? The answer is yes and no. The Web has sites that share information—for example, ReliefWeb, Humaninet, Aidworker, Development Gateway, and Interaction. The Web also has 200 other area-specific one-way sites; they offer regional overviews (country studies, maps, charts, and links) and one specific area of study or interest, specific organization-related information, news, and current events.

The ICIN concept is different because designed for the “on-the-ground” responder; it essentially collaborates, interacts, serves as a one-stop shop, and collates information from all other sites. Building ICIN ultimately helps the victims of various crises. Through the sharing and collaboration of techniques, insights, and problems solved, the ICIN will empower the military, nongovernmental agencies, and international organizations to provide effective relief to those in need. Specifically, the operative goals of the ICIN are to reduce the separation between these communities (though that gap will most likely never be removed completely), capture lessons learned or techniques, insights and problems solved), and jointly provide a more efficient service to our customer base, those adversely affected by natural and man-made disasters.

A prototype Web site has been established and tested as part of the Cebrowski Institute at the Naval Postgraduate School; its URL is www.crisisinfonetwork.org. The technology used for the creation of the Web site will be commercial-off-the-shelf and compatible with both Microsoft and Macintosh operating systems. The host server,

which the Cebrowski Institute manages, is essentially “attached” to the school via funding, personnel, and professional relationships. The decision to utilize the school server was based on availability, cost,¹ and *credibility*. The Web site could easily be hosted on a commercial server such as Yahoo™, but we elected to utilize an environment that would be free from outside influences. Despite being funded and housed in a Navy installation, the Web site and server will in no way be used for data-mining or any other type of subversive actions. The server will simply be a physical location for the Web site to reside until it can be migrated to another server for further use and expansion.

The technological variants that could be used to manage the data would be located in at least three locations around the globe. The technology that once took up entire floors in office buildings now only occupies the space of a hall closet. The technological aspects of the project will come in time and change drastically in the course of the coming months.

Web Site Component Attributes

Throughout the research development process, specific attributes surfaced that were very desirable for both civilian and military persons. This section will focus on those attributes in a nontechnical manner and include specific areas of interest:

- a. Foundation on which the Web site is situated
- b. Contents of the open portion (non-password protected area)
- c. Features that are designed to attract users, the core-members area, and three technological aspects of the site.

Throughout the research, especially during interviews with both military and nongovernmental agencies, the opinion was that the primary domain through which to operate the Web site would be an .org (organization) or .int (international) address, as opposed to the .mil, .state, or .gov type. Choosing .org or .int enhances the anonymity of the site and its users, and the foundation of the site rests on this fact. The ICIN will continually strive to set itself apart from the military, government, or state influence.

Open Source. This area of the Web site will be completely unclassified and based upon projects that are open to the public and which

draw on other projects that are freely available to the general public. It will not include military maps, charts, or other items that are normally classified. The intent is to share information freely. The only way to share such information is to ensure it is void of anything that may be used against a military or civilian force. Too often, especially in a combat situation where humanitarian aid is being conducted, the military tends to over-classify information, including the daily weather reports.

In designing the Web site, two other features became requirements. First, for it to be international, it must be multilingual. While the prototype is in English, the most prominent additional languages for future expansion would include French and German. The reason is because a vast majority of the humanitarian organizations use offices that are based in Europe. Additional languages to consider would be Spanish, Japanese, Russian, and Italian. Second, the Web site must have the ability to operate in both high and low bandwidths. This feature would be selected on the Home page and allow users to choose the best dial-up or Internet connection for their specific location.

The authors drew upon the experiences of humanitarian professionals to design three primary attributes that would entice the user to visit the Web site and exchange useful information. The table on the next page presents the attributes.

Core Members. The core-members area of the Web site is where participants can share information and experiences with each other. It will be self-perpetuated by the individual users or members who feed the information into the Web site. This area will be protected by a secure log-in procedure, which will include creating a profile that does not connect them with their parent institution. The focus is ensuring a free flow of information. This simple security feature will also keep at bay persons who may wish to harm the Web site or its contents.

The hinge of this area is the blog section. Here the user can leave a message pertaining to a specific region, topic, or country. The blog also allows users to find each other each time they log in to the site. The blog section is intended to focus on user-to-user conversations and the creation of working networks.

| Attribute | Description |
|------------------------------|--|
| Consolidated events calendar | Designed so that the user can simply select a specific date or range of dates and view a short description of the events occurring. Once the user locates a topic of interest, he or she double-clicks the hyperlinked reference. The topic selected (hyperlink) would contain descriptions, information abstracts, and links to the host Web sites so that the user can see what conventions, seminars, and conferences are available in their immediate vicinity or particular line of work. |
| Online certification courses | The military provides opportunities for its personnel to advance their education at schools and institutions throughout their career. Humanitarian organizations do not have the ability to conduct college-level courses or postgraduate work for their volunteers or employees. Online certification courses are available in areas that include Emergency Management and NATO Civil-Military Cooperation and via the United Nations. |
| Advocacy postings | The user can view postings from specific regions and countries around the world to see what needs exist. |

At least monthly, ICIN will host mediated online discussion groups. Each topic will have a subject matter expert to host the discussion, and the intent of the group follows:

- a. Bring together users who are interested in or have experience with a particular topic.
- b. Gain a heightened awareness of the topic.
- c. Build networks of users who will continue to communicate with each other based on those shared/common experiences.

Techniques, Insights, and Problems Solved. This area of the site is where users can share the grassroots insights that can only be learned “on the ground.” The intent is to convey a need for information that cannot be derived from a book, report, or other Web site. The encouraged information to share would be those things that only a person working in a particular area in that country would know. The postings that give structure to techniques, insights, and problems solved are those things that are normally not passed on to the incoming personnel, are not relayed back to the headquarters of a responding nongovernmental agency or other service, and often cause doubling of work effort in numerous areas.

Technological Aspects. The site has three primary technological features:

- a. Rich Site Summary (RSS) feeds, which will be programmed directly into the site, gather information about specific topics.
- b. Wiki (Hawaiian word for “quick”) will allow the user to alter, modify, and update the site. Giving the member an opportunity to make a functional update or change to the site gives a sense of “belonging” to the experience. The objective of this self-regulatory element is to facilitate sharing information that is beneficial for the humanitarian community.
- c. Drupal, an open-source content-management platform, will allow the Cebrowski Institute team to quickly stand up the site.

Conclusion

Numerous organizations in the world are trying to provide aid and relief to those who are suffering from natural and man-made disasters. While this effort is extremely noble, many of the occasions have been futile due to agencies not cooperating or collaborating. The result has been duplication of effort, aid or relief not being delivered, or the loss of time and resources because organizations are reinventing the wheel. For these reasons, it is imperative that militaries, governmental and nongovernmental agencies, and international organizations come together and share information.

All parties involved must recognize and address this need. The mission to build ICIN directly relates to ultimately helping the victims of various crises. Through the sharing and collaboration of techniques, insights, and problems solved, ICIN will empower these organizations to provide effective relief to those in need. ↑

Endnote

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1. The authors, as students, are being hosted free of charge.

Radical Islam's Legitimization of Suicide Terror

Duane L. Gordin

The suicide-terror tactic is increasing and the current radical Islamic penchant for legitimizing and employing this tactic against the West warrants greater understanding. This paper provides historical perspectives and characteristics on suicide terror. It also proposes adopting Special Operations Forces (SOF)-proven rapport-building and cultural awareness methods over the long term to reduce the legitimization of the suicide-terror tactic.

Fanatics espousing radical Islam are increasingly resorting to suicide-terror methods for achieving their objectives. For the terrorist and the victims, suicide terror is perhaps the most heinous tactic in the current operating environment. While suicide terror is merely one battlefield tactic used to achieve a desired end state, the current radical Islamic penchant for legitimizing and employing this tactic against the West warrants greater understanding. Understanding this tactic increases awareness of extremist root causes and by extension, may reveal applications relevant to the overall Global War on Terror (GWOT.) This paper provides historical perspectives and characteristics on suicide terror and proposes adopting SOF-proven rapport-building and cultural awareness methods to reduce the legitimization of the suicide-terror tactic.

This paper is limited to increasing awareness of suicide-terror history and characteristics and recommending a SOF approach to combating this tactic. The author recognizes that a host of political, informational, religious, and economic factors—beyond the scope of the military instrument of power—must work in concert with the

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adoption of rapport-building and cultural awareness special operations practices. This concerted effort must bridge the gap between the various coalition and U.S. national agencies that wield their respective instruments of power.

Historical Perspectives of Suicide Terror

Various adversary groups have invoked suicide-terror tactics throughout history. Suicide terrorists historically employ their weapon as an asymmetric tactic to “level the playing field” versus the might of the superior adversary.¹ Suicide terror is not a modern phenomenon, and the practice spans multiple religions and regional areas.² When pre-gunpowder era terrorists—who can be declared the *suicide* type—acted, they fully expected capture and/or death. For example, Jewish Zealots killed Roman adversaries in the 1st century AD while sacrificing their own lives.³ One thousand years later, Ismailis (assassins) expected capture and execution soon after stabbing their targets in broad daylight in a quest to spread their version of Islam during the 11th through 13th centuries.⁴

World War II Japanese kamikazes provide more recent memories of suicide terror. Religious and cultural influences stemming from ancient samurai traditions were key factors that secured kamikaze resolve.⁵ The modern use of suicide terror against the United States (U.S.) materialized in Lebanon in 1983.⁶ On 18 April, 63 people perished when a suicide bomber, driving a truck with 400 pounds of explosives, blasted into Beirut’s U.S. embassy.⁷ Then on 23 October, two simultaneous vehicle-born suicide attacks ensued:

- a. At a French base in Beirut, 58 French troops died from a 400-pound truck attack.
- b. A suicide bomber driving a 12,000-pound explosive hit the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut and killed 242 Americans.⁸

The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for each of the aforementioned suicide attacks.⁹

Of course, the most devastating suicide-terror attacks occurred on 11 September 2001 (9/11). Early in the business day, Al Qaeda operatives killed nearly 3,000 Americans and other nationalities by using passenger airliners as high-speed, high-explosive projectiles to strike the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon. In addition, suicide terrorists hijacked United Airlines flight 93 in an attempt

to attack a fourth destination. The attempt failed due to passenger heroics. However, all passengers died when flight 93 crashed in a field in Pennsylvania.

While 9/11 was horrific, radical Islam-based suicide terror continues to manifest in Israel and Iraq. Unfortunately, the Israelis have a continuing base of experience from multiple suicide-terror attacks over the last two decades. The U.S. and coalition forces are also combating this tactic regularly in Iraq. Worldwide, the period from 2001-2003 experienced more suicide attacks than in the 25 years prior to 2001.¹⁰

Jewish Zealots in the 1st century and Japanese kamikazes in the 20th century provided evidence that suicide terror is neither a new phenomenon nor confined to radical Islam. Moreover, history established a conflict perspective where the suicide terrorist lacked appropriate firepower when compared to a superior adversary. Indeed, before his assassination by Israeli operatives, the leader of Hamas—Sheikh Amhmad Yasin—stated, “Once we have warplanes and missiles, then we can think of changing our means of legitimate self-defense. But right now, we can only tackle the fire with our bare hands and sacrifice ourselves.”¹¹

Today, Al Qaeda presents a similar stance with few choices against America and Israel in light of their inferior firepower position. Ominously, this terrorist perception could allow for the murder of hundreds of thousands if suicide¹² terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Suicide-Terror Characteristics

The historical perspective established suicide terror as an enduring tactic employed by diverse groups in an inferior firepower position. One must also consider several other important characteristics to recognize opportunities for reducing the legitimization of suicide terror.

While there are multiple attempts to define *terror* and *suicide terror*, the best approach is the concise one. Terror consists of two parts: it targets noncombatants, and terrorist acts influence a specific audience often generating fear.¹³ The suicide aspect of the definition adds a qualifier that the assailant deliberately plans and expects to die in the terrorist incident.¹⁴ Therefore, suicide terror occurs

when an attacker, expecting death, targets noncombatants in order to influence an audience.

No clear consensus exists on the root causes of suicide terror; however, one can identify the most likely causes. Jessica Stern, a former fellow on terrorism at the Council on Foreign Relations, spent 5 years interviewing religious terrorists from antiabortionists to Pakistani and Indonesian militants. Stern provides five grievances used by radical leadership figures to draft terrorists in the name of religion: exploit feelings of alienation, exploit feelings of humiliation, use demographic shifts, read history selectively, and use territorial disputes.¹⁵ Clearly these grievances play a key role in indoctrinating the suicide terrorist.

Mia Bloom, assistant professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati and a consultant for New Jersey Office of Counterterrorism, postulates the following common suicide bombing themes throughout history:¹⁶

- a. Role of early education in creating adherents
- b. Appearance of charismatic and ambitious leaders
- c. Disputes over occupied territory
- d. Manipulation of religion to induce followers to kill in the name of God.

From a military perspective, one could equate both Stern's grievances and Bloom's themes to terrorist "logical lines of operation." According to U.S. Joint Publication 3-0, logical lines of operation "connect actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s)."¹⁷ The enemy exploits the Stern and Bloom conditions, or logical lines of operations, to connect actions related in time and purpose to enemy objectives.

Considering the current operating environment, one should add media fanfare following the attack to these enemy lines of operation. This line of operation is practiced regularly today. For example, Hamas photographs suicide-bomber candidates in heroic poses for recruiting posters and calendars following a successful attack.¹⁸ Researchers attribute considerable significance to this theme in today's terrorist organizations.¹⁹

Suicide terror is an insidious endeavor where radical leaders may utilize their personnel only once. Thus, education methods to create future members permeate nearly every suicide-terror characteristic.

This concept is not new as the Ismaili assassins of the 12th century used religious schools to elicit their message.²⁰ Today's radical messages propagate beyond the formal classroom and into the societal fabric and discourse in places like Palestine. A self-perpetuating culture of martyrdom is evolving²¹ where the suicide-terror education begins in the nursery. One researcher noted the extreme nature to which radical Islam inculcates followers:

Parents dressed their babies and toddlers as suicide bombers and had them photographed in local photography studios. Children marched with suicide belts around their chests. University exhibitions included one that recreated an actual suicide bombing carried out in the Sbarro restaurant in Jerusalem, replete with pizza slices and bloody body parts.²²

Acceptance of suicide-terror tactics is another disturbing characteristic that reveals another potential enemy line of operation. While current trends are unsettling, social acceptance and popularity portend suicide-terror proliferation at an alarming pace. In Palestine, "the number of volunteer bombers often exceeds the number of bombs," available to attack their Israeli targets.²³ Palestinians celebrate every suicide bomber by a custom, where friends, family, and even strangers descend upon the party to offer congratulations on the perceived act of martyrdom.²⁴ Posters depicting suicide-bomber heroism throughout the community are also prolific.

Acceptance and popularity are not exclusive to radical Islamic sects. To the chagrin of some moderate Muslims, suicide terror is increasingly accepted within the Islamic world. Abd Al-Rhman Al-Rashed, general manager of the Arab Satellite network Al 'Arabiya, wrote these controversial words following the 2004 Beslan attacks in Ossetia:

Obviously not all Muslims are terrorists, but regrettably, the majority of the terrorists in the world are Muslims. The kidnappers of the students in Ossetia are Muslims. The kidnappers and killers of the Nepalese workers and cooks are also Muslims. Those who rape and murder in Darfur are Muslims, and their victims are Muslim as well. Those who blew up the residential complexes in Riyadh and Al-Khobar are Muslims ... The two [women] who blew up the two planes

[over Russia] are Muslims. Bin Laden is a Muslim...The majority of those who carried out suicide operations against busses, schools, houses, and buildings around the world in the last 10 years are also Muslims.

What a terrible record... We have to recognize that we cannot correct the condition of our youth who carry out these disgraceful operations until we have treated the minds of our sheikhs who have turned themselves into pulpit revolutionaries who send the children of others to fight while they send their own children to European schools.²⁵

Acceptance and popularity empower terrorists to sustain or grow their recruiting capabilities. Leveraging acceptance, radical Islamic recruiters attempt to close the deal with the benefits to the individual suicide terrorist and his family. Hamas recruiters continue to highlight perceived heavenly rewards for committing the desperate act of suicide murder. They tell the recruit “paradise awaits him...his family name will be held in highest respect...he’ll be remembered as a *shaheed* (martyr, a hero)...his family’s status will be raised significantly,” and it will be emphasized that he will be rewarded with 72 virgins in paradise.²⁶ One failed suicide bomber, captured in Israel before he could execute his mission, revealed his expected returns for the act. He believed he would receive a “good” seat in paradise and that he would be forgiven of his murder.²⁷

Suicide Terror, a Microcosm?

Suicide-terror history and characteristics present a daunting situation. The many facets of suicide terror exist in today’s global fabric, but it remains a tactic. The U.S. and her partners cannot win a war against radical extremists by merely defeating a single battlefield tactic. Despite this dilemma, the U.S. needs to look deeper into suicide terror. As the most daunting and dispiriting battlefield tactic, suicide terror offers an ironic clarity on enemy lines of operation in the GWOT. Upon understanding, one can exploit the weaknesses of enemy lines of operation and carve a path toward victory.

The U.S. must invent or rediscover and employ methods to decrease the growing appetite of suicide terror in radical Islam. The objective of such methods is to deny potential recruits to the enemy. Unfortunately, systemic problems that evolved over generations—for

example, poor governance; poor wealth distribution; and blaming the Western world for troubles—sustain the enemy lines of operation that exploit desperate feelings, selective historical interpretations, territorial disputes, and religion. To unravel such systemic problems, it will likely take generations to reduce terror to mutable levels. Exacerbating this pace is the dearth of Middle Eastern leadership for positive change.

Though the West champions a peaceful world, they have little credibility with the target Islamic population. With remarkable history, culture, peoples, holy cities, and oil wealth the Middle East is the power hub of Islam. Sweeping change originating from outsiders is improbable, but influence can, over time, have positive effects. The challenge is to find the best methods that both the moderate Muslim community and the West can apply and stick with them over the long term.

A SOF Community Approach

While it is necessary in the short term to kill or capture suicide terrorists who are beyond an ideological point of no return, the history and characteristics of suicide terror show that the current operating environment will continue to churn out new recruits over the long term. As a result, affecting change across enemy lines of operation requires a successful strategy that addresses both short- and long-term concerns. In the short term, the U.S. continues to address Homeland Security and execute Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom to increase protection from terrorist attacks. Over the long term the strategy must encompass “preemptively penetrating and destroying terrorist organizations” and most importantly “understanding and acting on the root causes of terrorism so as to drastically reduce the receptivity of potential recruits to the message and methods of terror-sponsoring organizations, mostly through political, economic, and social action programs.”²⁸ The long-term strategy that attacks root causes of suicide terror (previously identified as the enemies’ logical lines of operation) needs a methodology for success. One need look no further than the SOF community.

Rapport-building and cultural awareness, hallmarks of Army Special Forces, present a feasible long-term path to combating suicide terror. Rapport-building and cultural awareness are time-

consuming endeavors that typically produce returns slowly. In the power hub of Islam, where relationships are valued more than short-term objectives, one will observe significant returns on investment over years, not weeks or months. However, one must accept such timelines and weaken the enemy lines of operation revealed by suicide terror in order to overcome the terrorist enemy. An excerpt describes the level of commitment for Special Forces unconventional warfare methodology:

From a Special Forces perspective, the goal of unconventional warfare is to help win a war by working with—as opposed to neutralizing or fighting around—local populations. Unconventional warfare represents a classically indirect, and ultimately local, approach to waging warfare. It demands that efforts at all levels—strategic, tactical, and operational—be coordinated. To work with indigenous forces, SOF must win their trust. To do this, they live with them, eat with them, and share the same living conditions. They also take the opportunity to study local practices and learn social preferences. Building trust invariably takes time, but the payoff comes in a better understanding of the operational environment...²⁹

In conjunction with unconventional warfare, one must also consider the key roles of psychological operations (PSYOP) and closely related Civil Affairs development in increasing rapport with a target population. The commander of the United States Special Operations Command, General Doug Brown, described the role of PSYOP forces, “By dispelling rumors and enemy propaganda, PSYOP forces educate and help inoculate the population against the subversive goals of extremist ideologies.”³⁰ Accordingly, PSYOP has much to offer in terms of eroding enemy lines of operation and sources of support. Put another way, one must outmaneuver one’s enemy to “counter their political-psychological support.”³¹

Instead of targeting local and regional levels, suicide terror is now employed on the global stage. In a global war, one needs the methods of Special Forces on a much larger scale than the SOF community alone can provide. Coalition nations and U.S. interagency partners need to invest considerably more into their personnel ranks and utilize rapport-building and cultural awareness methods. U.S.

administration officials have acknowledged the need for a Special Forces-like capability:

- a. Patricia Harrison, Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Cultural Affairs testified to Congress, "The foundation of our public diplomacy strategy is to engage, inform, and influence foreign publics in order to increase understanding for American values, policies, and initiatives."³²
- b. In 2004, then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice advised basic goals to "dispel destructive myths about both U.S. culture and policy and to encourage voices advocating moderation, tolerance, and pluralism in the Muslim world."³³

Both statements are analogous to the aforementioned Special Forces methods. However, these goals are unattainable if U.S. administration and department personnel lack a mutual respect through effective cultural awareness and rapport with their Muslim counterparts.

While it is unlikely that national and international GWOT partners can invest in their personnel as much as the Special Forces community, it is time to adopt a slice of these proven practices. A key question for a coalition partner or U.S. department/agency involved in the GWOT is "How much time and money are we investing in rapport-building and cultural awareness?"

Applying the Special Forces methodology to global suicide-terror lines of operation cannot occur in a vacuum within the Department of Defense. Application must occur on an international and inter-agency scale. Only through this wider approach can one expect to reduce radical Islamic proclivity for suicide-terror tactics and thereby reduce the ability of radical Islamic terrorists to harm innocents.

Conclusion

Suicide-terror acts have a long history, spanning various religious and regional identities. Suicide terrorists historically favor this tactic as an asymmetric weapon wielded by inferior adversaries. Multiple enemy logical lines of operation will continue to support suicide-terror tactics; however, few panaceas exist to curb its legitimization within the Islamic community. Accordingly, coalition and interagency partners need to adopt Special Forces rapport-building and cultural

awareness practices over the long term. In order to be successful, all efforts necessarily rely on mutual respect between coalition partners and the Middle East. Through this approach, the U.S. can dedicate considerably more effort to thwarting the underlying motivations behind suicide terror and by extension, the GWOT. ↑

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Using Money for Counterinsurgency Operations

Leonard J. DeFrancisci

This paper examines the use of money in combat as a means of driving a wedge between insurgents and the local people and to build legitimacy for coalition forces. The disbursing of money was decentralized to tactical levels within a division to gain immediate impact for a series of multiple, low-cost projects that could stimulate local businesses and get people to work. During Operation Al Fajr, a \$200 solatia payment was provided to all heads of household via this decentralized system. Such actions helped to shape public opinion and promote legitimacy for local officials and the coalition force. The author concludes that units in combat must have the authority and capacity to spend money in a timely manner to support operational objectives.

The assertion was that money influences people, and people were a critical strength in the insurgency. Thus, money used correctly can influence a counterinsurgency (COIN) by shaping the battlefield in favor of the coalition. In Fallujah, insurgents derived significant strength from the local population, and the connection between the Iraqi people and the insurgents was a key factor in their effectiveness.

To attack this strength, Regimental Combat Team 1 Marines in Fallujah sought ways to sever the link or at least drive a wedge between the insurgents and the local people. Marine Civil Affairs used money to draw Fallujans towards the coalition and away from the insurgents by influencing local public opinion and perceptions. Money was also used to assist local Iraqi leaders in gaining control of an area and to build legitimacy of coalition forces, further increasing the split between insurgents and their much-needed popular

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support. Separating the people from the insurgents reduced the enemy's base of operations and ability to maneuver, thereby reducing his overall combat potential.

Marine Civil Affairs in Fallujah employed money for relief and reconstruction, as well as attending to the needs and grievances of the people. For effectiveness, focusing on the people was essential, particularly through timely efforts that assuaged concerns. Timeliness maximized the effect of money and prevented enemy use of potentially exploitable situations that commonly occur on the battlefield. As an example, Marine Civil Affairs used money during the Battle of Fallujah to purchase and set up—within 24 hours of request by the local people—large water tanks for areas with broken water lines.



Civil Affairs contracts setup of water container during Operation Al Fajr (January 2005)

Setting up the Force for Success

The system for providing money for Iraq relief and reconstruction was essentially designed for deliberately planned, long-term reconstruction projects. After noticing a lack of responsiveness for funding high impact, quick reaction uses of money, the Marines fixed this problem prior to the Battle of Fallujah. As a result, improvements in the funding system provided expanded ability to use money on the battlefield. In addition to conducting long-term reconstruction, money provided an excellent mechanism for the commander to focus on immediate needs of civilians and rapidly respond to grievances.

Creating a Responsive Funding System. For the Battle of Fallujah, building a capability for the immediate use of money required structuring units and designing a paying system specifically for this purpose. From both a personnel and system perspective, these units contained as organic elements of the organization all pieces necessary to approve and make on-the-spot monetary payments in a field environment. To effectively use money on the battlefield, Regimental Combat Team 1 Civil Affairs teams had one Marine authorized as a paying agent with

\$50,000 in cash on hand and a second Marine authorized to execute contracts of up to \$3,000 each, without having to use the normal project approval process. This gave the cash on hand and a mechanism in place to make immediate, discretionary payments as the need arose similar to a petty cash system. This construct facilitated use of money to influence a situation in a timely manner by bypassing the normal time-consuming and labor-intensive administrative process of securing funding and making payments for projects.

Prior to this new structure, the process for securing funds in Fallujah generally required final approval at division level or higher. After approval, a cash payment required a paying agent from the disbursing office. The desire for centralized fiduciary oversight at division level with redundant checks and balances created a cumbersome approval system replete with bottlenecks. This system did not facilitate rapid use and placed those responsible for final approval at a considerable distance from the using units, which made it particularly difficult to accomplish during field operations. Indeed, the cumbersome funding process often took several days to complete, including the submission of electronic documents to 1st Marine Division headquarters in Ramadi for approval. This process resulted in a time lag of 1 to 3 days for the use of money once a need arose, which created a detrimental time delay between identification of a requirement and application of a resource. Such delays often depleted the effects of money once finally used and often negated using money as an option all together, especially for highly beneficial fleeting “targets of opportunity.”

Military commanders, as with leaders in any organization, were ultimately responsible for good stewardship of money generally with the financial officer or comptroller as the senior manager. Due to the high profile inherent to matters involving money and the potential for misuse in the chaotic environment of Iraq, the comptroller understandably desired tight accountability of money and built the funding process around centralized financial control. Commensurate with best financial practices, this included earmarking money to projects or accounts prior to authorizing its use, which occurred at the division level for al-Anbar province of Iraq.

For the Battle of Fallujah, effective use of money required delegation of its control below the division level to the on-the-ground Marines who were in the best position to influence events with its use.

Consequently, decentralizing control increased speed of use, which exponentially increased effectiveness. In essence, delegating dispersing authority for certain uses of money reduced the “red tape” of using the normal financial channels, which increased effectiveness of this important tool. At the same time, to maintain a good balance between rapid response and centralized control, this delegation of authority was limited to a maximum of \$3,000 per use, which accounted for the majority of high-impact projects, initiatives, or other uses requiring rapid funding. Normal long-term, high-dollar reconstruction projects did not meet this criterion, but these more extensive efforts could still be executed using the normal funding approval process.

Despite instituting decentralized financial controls in the rapid response funding system for Fallujah, Marines preserved oversight and accountability of money by having two Marines in the payment process: one letting contracts and one dispensing money. Submitting all payment vouchers and contract records to division on a regular basis provided additional accountability of funds. Though the system contained the potential for misuse, the significant benefit gained through rapid use of money outweighed this concern.

Using Money on the Battlefield

Selecting Effective Targets. As a general rule, Civil Affairs teams operating in Fallujah in 2004 preferred a larger number of lower cost projects than a fewer number of higher cost projects. More projects usually meant wider coverage of space and more people involved and affected. Lower cost projects also usually meant smaller scale with better completion rate—getting money to the people quicker or attending



Civil Affairs inspects repairs on
pump house outside Fallujah
(September 2004)

to needs faster. With an active insurgency, larger-scale projects were exponentially more complex and took much longer to complete. Prolonged projects were also generally higher visibility, and those involved were more susceptible to intimidation by insurgents or projects were susceptible to sabotage. Overall for the commander, more projects of lower cost generally meant “better bang for the buck” in terms of impact on the local population.

Two key objectives existed for using a “more projects, low-cost” scheme:

- a. This approach usually resulted in better spread of money to more people with the hope that the money bounced around two or three times in the local economy, thereby further stimulating local business.
- b. Using money created opportunities to constructively engage civilians, fostering goodwill and promoting positive perceptions. During situations when money was used, a key objective was the interaction and dialogue with civilians under good circumstances, which facilitated relationship building and drew civilians toward the coalition.

More projects meant increased positive interaction with more civilians, and this increase resulted in a wider impact on the overall population. Interestingly, in situations where Civil Affairs teams provided money to civilians, actionable intelligence was frequently obtained—a significant benefit for the commander in a COIN operation.¹

It was not about the money spent, however, but rather about the desired effect gained. Sometimes the objective was to bolster the prestige of local leaders in the eyes of their public, and empowering these leaders assisted them in maintaining credibility and control of the area. Such leaders were powerful allies in a COIN and were crucial for driving a wedge between the people and rebelling forces. Due to their position or status, local leaders also had the ability to “spread the word” to a broad audience or influence a large group, often with substantial power behind their words. Thus, good target choices for use of money were projects designated by or for the local civil officials and other key leadership figures, such as religious, business, and tribal leaders and medical and legal representatives. Involving these key leaders was critical in determining and selecting

projects and other initiatives that best settle otherwise intractable grievances, including their own.

High unemployment caused major problems in many parts of al-Anbar province, particularly in areas hit heaviest by the insurgency, and lack of work was a main grievance of the local population. Unemployed military-aged males were often recruited by insurgents or drawn toward the insurgency based on their discontent with the overall situation. Consequently, short-term projects (not including rebuilding critical infrastructure or improving force protection) that were labor intensive were preferred. When evaluating several proposals for the same project, the one that offered the most local jobs usually won the bid even over factors such as price and quality. Keeping military-age males busy, both in mind and body, was key to keeping them out of the potential insurgent recruiting pool.

Initiatives that created sustainable, long-term jobs were powerful, but difficult in Fallujah because of restrictions on using Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. CERP was not permitted for funding projects specifically targeted for an individual's personal gain, such as assisting a business. Moreover, most of the reconstruction projects only created short-term employment—generally for the duration of the specific reconstruction project—and after that period, the jobs expired. In some cases, Civil Affairs personnel provided businesses in Fallujah with money to bolster their operations, but not at the level to sustain real economic development necessary to provide steady flow of new, sustained jobs.

To promote long-term job growth, Regimental Combat Team 1 Civil Affairs developed concepts for use of grants for businesses specifically tied to job creation—money given to a concern provided it was used to grow the business in a way that directly added jobs, especially in the short term. In addition, providing assets to assist or create new businesses was part of the proposed economic development concept. For example, a welding machine or a bread-baking oven given to a promising Iraqi would provide him with an ability to start a new business, become self-sustaining, and a productive member of society and possibly employ a few others. At the same time, this limited the possibility for misuse of funds through direct issue of assets, not money. Unfortunately, none of the plans were executed due to restrictions on CERP funds.

Throughput of Projects and Reach of Force. When using a “more projects, low-cost” scheme, the limiting factor became throughput; a Civil Affairs team could only effectively manage a limited number of projects or initiatives at one time. During operations in Fallujah, the Civil Affairs detachment supporting Regimental Combat Team 1 reorganized to add two additional Civil Affairs teams, which increased throughput of projects and initiatives. However, spending money in Fallujah was generally limited to the Civil Affairs Marines and a few Seabees. Increased throughput of funded projects and initiatives could have been possible by further delegating the ability to spend money at the small unit level—those Marines operating on the ground in daily contact with the civilians. However, this option was not implemented. Applying such an option could have had a significant benefit, but it would have required a rethinking of financial control toward a decentralized structure—certainly a tough sell to the comptroller.

The Marines on the ground in Fallujah best understood the civilian populace in their particular area and were building important relationships with those civilians. Money opened many possibilities for reinforcing those relationships, particularly through quick response to local needs or requests. In Fallujah, quick response usually meant exponentially better results and significantly increased the credibility of the coalition in the eyes of the public. By making things happen for them, the civilians saw that Marines kept their promises and cared about the needs of the local population. As a result, the civilians saw that the coalition responded to their grievances, solved their problems, or made their bad situation a little better. In comparison, such actions provided a stark contrast to those of the insurgents. For the Marines, quickly resolving grievances for the local populace showed not only a desire to help but also an ability to resolve problems better than insurgents. This positive image created an advantage over the enemy in legitimacy building and shoring up public support.

Having more capability to spend money quickly increased the potential to favorably influence more civilians. To build this capacity would mean authorizing more Marines to spend money beyond just Civil Affairs teams. This action would require significantly liberalizing the funding mechanism to expedite use of money by more forces.

More Marines employing money as a tool for resolving grievances and generating goodwill provides an ability to bolster public support over a wider geographical area. Moreover, additional capacity created an expanded ability or reach of the force to engage more civilians in positive ways. In essence, multiple units could simultaneously leverage money at one time and in a wider space to affect more civilians than could be accomplished solely by Civil Affairs teams. In terms of financial cost, funding this added capacity would represent only a small fraction of the entire relief and reconstruction money used in Iraq.

In addition to expanding reach, more of the force would be seen in a positive light, not just a few Civil Affairs Marines who were spending all the money. Overall, building these relationships and connections with civilians would dovetail with the 1st Marine Division commanding general's mantra, "Marines, no better friend, no worse enemy."

In terms of throughput, increasing reach of the force and the tempo of attending to the grievances and needs of the population would, in effect, shift local dissatisfaction to the insurgents rather than on the coalition or the government. Quickly addressing the needs of as many civilians as possible provided the initiative for the coalition over the insurgents in the battle for public support.

Reconstruction. The Battle of Fallujah in November 2004, the operation to seize the city of Fallujah—an insurgent stronghold with 4,000 enemy fighters and a symbol for resistance—came as no surprise. What was surprising was the speed at which Fallujah was reconstructed afterward, considering the extent of the damage in the city. Key infrastructure was restored within weeks, and stopgap measures to provide essential services in lieu of repaired infrastructure were established prior to repopulation of the city after the battle. The use of money, specifically the speed of funding and the throughput of projects, was critical to success in rapid reconstruction. This action fostered positive perception and public opinion for both the Marines and the Iraqi interim government.

A small, but important example of Marines using money to influence a situation occurred early in Phase III (seize and secure the city) of Operation Al Fajr in November 2004. During the battle, the sewer water-pumping stations stopped functioning, which contributed to

significant citywide flooding that restricted the ability of Marines to maneuver. Marine Civil Affairs teams paid Iraqi municipal workers to identify the location of sewer water-pumping stations, which required entering the city. Initially, these workers were understandably reluctant to go into Fallujah while combat operations were ongoing; however, money provided the necessary incentive. Afterwards, these workers were proud to say that they worked with the Marines in the early phases of the operation. Indeed, they told the story to other Iraqis about how they teamed up with the Marines to mitigate flooding damage, thereby saving infrastructure and houses in Fallujah—a powerful information operations message delivered by an Iraqi.

In Phase III of Operation Al Fajr, Civil Affairs teams also used on-hand rapid reconstruction funds to hire Fallujans for numerous working parties to conduct a variety of tasks. These tasks assisted with the initial cleanup of the city and provided labor to conduct many activities related to relief and reconstruction. The Iraqi working parties relieved burden on the Marines in conducting these same activities. More importantly, these working parties provided a source of quick employment for many unemployed military-aged males and an influx of money into the economy during a critical and impressionable time for the civilians in the area.

During the Battle of Fallujah, the Marines provided each Iraqi head of household in the city with a \$200 solatia² payment. Over 33,000 families



Iraqi municipal workers try to fix a generator in sewer water lift station during Operation Al Fajr (November 2004)



Iraqi working party morning formation in Fallujah

received this payment for a total of over \$6.6 million distributed in a 1-week period, and this massive endeavor touched every Fallujan. These efforts not only built goodwill with the local population but also jump-started the rebuilding effort and the local economy. The efforts also focused the energy of the people on reconstruction.

Marines and Iraqi Army provide \$200 solatia payment to all heads of household during Operation Al Fajr



After conducting raids in Fallujah, Civil Affairs teams followed directly behind the assault element and provided immediate payment to anyone in the area not affiliated with the enemy that received battle damage, including broken windows and doors of nearby houses. This proactive effort eliminated the requirement for the civilians to make a claim at the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). The CMOC often had long lines, and settling a solatia claim required multiple trips there (creating delays and frustration for those with a claim). The immediate remuneration for damage conducted on-the-spot after a raid eliminated grievances and assuaged concerns before insurgents could exploit the situation.

The guiding principle for Civil Affairs during Phase IV (Transition) of Operation Al Fajr was focus on the people, not solely on reconstruction. Eliminating needs and grievances of the people disarmed the insurgents and stifled their initiative. While it was important to highlight the destructive nature of insurgents, to win over the civilians in the long run, it was also important that they believed the



Iraqi contractors fix broken door in Fallujah during Operation Al Fajr (December 2004)

situation would improve with the elimination of insurgents. While the Marines aggressively eliminated insurgents, they also tried to

assist those neutral parties caught up in the situation, an important message to maintain support of the local populace.

Avoiding Pitfalls. When selecting projects and initiatives or spending money, the Civil Affairs teams in Fallujah considered it important to act as follows:

- a. Avoid larger, more expensive projects that involved only a few people. Many perceived these types of projects as showing favoritism because they only benefited a small number of people, thus offsetting some of the desired effects.
- b. Align projects with needs or wants of the people to achieve a desired effect. Personnel that selected projects for an area far removed usually lacked the local situational awareness to implement the projects aligned with the needs of the people. In fact, sometimes projects that seemed like a good idea from afar were often counterproductive. Baghdad officials discussed building a high cost, state-of-the-art sewer treatment plant in Fallujah. However, the Fallujans cared little about such a project, and it would have added little value to the overall effort in stabilizing the area or winning hearts and minds. In addition, the Fallujans lacked the technical expertise to run such a facility.
- c. Keep the contractors local even if they were more expensive or lower quality. In Fallujah, many of the larger projects were done by contractors from Baghdad; the Fallujans resented that those workers were often also from Baghdad.
- d. Watch for undue corruption or graft. A certain level of graft was always a cost of doing business in Iraq, but an unusually high level probably included a payoff to insurgents.
- e. Attempt to gain local buy-in of projects with the city council and keep them informed of the progress. Many times, the city council facilitated or hindered the execution of a project. The city council can also gain credibility in the eyes of the public for the implementation of a project in their area, which maximizes its effect.
- f. Spread load contracts to promote fairness and expand reach. Contracts executed only in the Civil-Military Operations Center or in a centralized location often caused recurring use of the same contractors and employment of the same people.

Also, this practice increased the chance of criminal activity on contractors, such as theft or intimidation.

Conclusion

Civil Affairs achieved results with money by shaping public opinion and promoting legitimacy. Money provided options to solve problems and resolve grievances of the locals. This approach shored up support for the coalition forces and Iraqi officials by enhancing their credibility and capability to respond to needs of the local population. It set favorable conditions to draw civilians away from the insurgency or kept them neutral. Money also exposed insurgents by stripping away their local support and stimulating dialogue that often led to usable information about the enemy. Good use of money also weakened the insurgency by countering the ability for the enemy to promote his cause or exploit a situation. In summary, to make a significant impact in the area, each unit required more capability to spend money in a rapid and timely manner. This aspect was especially important in a nonpermissive environment when many relief organizations outside the military were not willing to enter an area due to security concerns or not understanding the local dynamics to operate successfully in the region. ↑

Endnotes

The author thanks CWO Gerald Reese and Captain Alex Henegar, Civil Affairs team leaders, and Regimental Combat Team 1 Combat Camera for permission to use photos.

1. Civil Affairs teams operating in Fallujah repeatedly noticed a direct correlation between money exchanged with civilians and information received. Actionable intelligence included information that led to the commander taking action—for example, information about locations of improvised explosive devices, weapons caches, or those who were intimidating others (bad actors).
2. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, solatia was a form of payment used by a military commander to provide compensation to a neutral party (a civilian not affiliated with the enemy) that sustained collateral damage to a house or business or death or serious injury to a family member. However, providing a solatia payment was not an admission of guilt by the U.S. Government.

Enabling Economic Stabilization

Michael Zinno

This paper examines the United States military, specifically the Army's role in setting the conditions for economic stabilization in nonpermissive or semipermissive conflict environments. It also highlights economic stabilization resources available to military commanders and their staffs. The conclusion recommends several military reform measures that would facilitate the conduct of economic stabilization.

Many of the conflicts requiring military intervention since the demise of the Soviet Union are a result of a failed nation state. The reasons for the collapse of the nation state are varied, but the resulting effect on the population in those nations is the same. The population has no effective internal security, governance, and economy. While much attention is devoted to security and governance, little attention until recently is given to the economy. Philip Kao, a Presidential management fellow in the Joint Warfighting Center at Joint Forces Command, highlights numerous examples of academic work pointing toward a direct correlation between negative economic actions—such as greed, corruption, and natural resource exploitation—and their impact on a conflict.¹

As more evidence emerges that all three factors—security, governance, and economy—affect a conflict area, it is important to begin looking at their impact at work simultaneously. In the cases that Kao cites, it is the combination of the factors that facilitates the sanctuary of global terrorists, antigovernment insurgents, criminals, gangs, militias, and warlords. The population in these failed states cannot resist the infestation of these bad elements and have little chance to rid their homeland of them once so infested. In this environment of despair, the achievement of United States (U.S.) national security objectives is extremely difficult, and some new approaches are needed.

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The difficult contemporary operating environment requires a multidisciplined approach to U.S. military strategy, operations, and tactics that includes economic stabilization and development tasks. The scope of this paper is a discussion of the military's role in the economy, specifically development and subsequent stabilization. Within the military, U.S. Army Special Operations Forces—particularly Civil Affairs forces—provide the skills, knowledge, and attributes to support and enable conventional forces in economic stabilization. The discussion begins with the issue of other U.S. governmental agencies' roles and responsibilities and the gaps that exist between these responsibilities and their capabilities. The subsequent portion of the paper highlights resources available to the military planner and operator and gives a framework for planning and operating in the economic arena. Finally, recommendations are offered for future development of the U.S. military's capabilities to conduct economic development and stabilization.

The Spectrum of Response

National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) 44, signed 7 December 2005, gives clear direction to all U.S. governmental agencies as to their roles and responsibilities concerning stabilization and reconstruction: "The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities."² This directive directly resulted from the coordination challenges presented by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. With State in the lead, the Department of Defense was given the following task, "The Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate. The Secretaries of State and Defense will develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate."³ While NSPD 44 provided a good framework for future operations, it presented two challenges in implementation.

First and foremost, the initiative was not budgeted for the fiscal year 2005, and part of the supplemental budget request approved in May of 2005 included \$17 million of startup costs for the Department

of State.⁴ Secondly, the need for this capability was immediate in current operations around the world. This need created a gap between the requirements on the ground and the State Department's current capabilities. This gap led Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to issue DoD Directive 3000-05 in November of 2005 in support of economic development and stabilization:

U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so....revive or build the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure.⁵

So the U.S. military was back to square one and found itself, at least for the time being, managing economic development stabilization in areas not covered by the State Department. While the U.S. military has enjoyed many successes managing economic activity in current conflicts, it has an equal or larger list of failures due to not being properly trained. Thus for the near term, the challenge is in transforming the State and Defense Departments to manage the economic activity while simultaneously conducting operations around globe.

The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction developed an excellent planning tool for stabilization and reconstruction operations, entitled the Post-Conflict Essentials Tasks Matrix (PCETM).⁶ This document is an evolving list of all the tasks performed by the international community in the post-conflict environment, from initial response to long-term stabilization. The PCETM is organized in five categories:

- a. Security
- b. Governance and participation
- c. Humanitarian assistance and social well-being
- d. Economic stabilization and infrastructure
- e. Justice and reconciliation.

This paper focuses on the fourth category, economic stabilization and infrastructure and specifically just four of its eleven subcategories: employment generation, market economy, agricultural development, and infrastructure development. These subcategories represent the scope of most economic stabilization tasks that the U.S. military conducts in the absence of other agency involvement.

Employment Generation. The most immediate task conducted by the military in the stabilization phase of an operation is getting the population working. In addition to the obvious financial benefits to the population, employment serves two key purposes for the military:

- a. Builds ownership in the community and gives the population a vested interest in supporting the military effort of the U.S. and host nation to stabilize the nation.
- b. Removes a significant source of future insurgents, particularly young males, from the recruiting pool.

Providing immediate employment should be the initial main priority of stabilization operations. During the initial phases this effort may be rudimentary employment such as clearing debris or digging ditches, but as conditions improve for larger economic development, more long-lasting employment opportunities can be created.

The military planner has several resources available for assistance in immediate employment to alleviate poverty:

- a. The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) is a highly successful tool that can provide immediate seed money and salaries.
- b. Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) are appropriated funds in limited supply, yet quite often underutilized for creative employment-generation projects.
- c. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the best partner because their Office of Transition Initiatives is highly deployable and has quick funding for immediate employment generation. The main ally of the U.S. in many conflicts, Great Britain, has a similar organization—the Department for International Development—that can also assist.

As the conflict becomes increasingly stable, international and non-governmental organizations also become sources. Excellent source lists for these organizations are available on their Web sites.⁷

As the economic stabilization continues to mature, two additional tasks are conducted to provide the foundations for long-term economic stabilization:

- a. The military and its partners build consensus and community involvement. The approach is advocating that each community

develop, propose, and execute its own development projects using the military funding. One excellent example is USAID's Community Development Activity Program. Through this mechanism, a local board of community members can propose a project that addresses their deepest concerns—for example, a new water well, school, or rebuilt local factory. The well-developed proposal includes the community's commitment—that is, providing the human resources (contractors, laborers, engineers) to execute the project. The program engenders true ownership in the success of these employment-generation projects and foretells long-term community cooperation.

- b. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Civil Affairs teams conduct and facilitate a labor-force-and-skills assessment at the local, regional, and national level. The completed assessment forms the foundation for building a vocational and technical schooling plan at each level. If the assessment points to critical shortages of key labor skills, corrective actions will occur, understanding that education takes time. For example, the teams might bring in additional military or civilian assets from the U.S. and partner nations to fill the gap until local education is completed. If the time is not allowed for capacity building in the labor force, the momentum of economic stabilization will collapse.

Market Economy. Developing a functioning market economy at all levels allows for the money introduced during the employment-generation tasks to affect more of the population. A laborer now has money to purchase essentials—for example, food, gas, and clothing—for himself and his family. As he spends his money on these goods, other merchants profit and in turn do the same with other merchants. While establishing a national market economy is generally an extremely challenging task for the military, most of their focus should be at the local level. As local markets develop, a natural demand occurs for larger regional and national markets that will provide opportunities for entrepreneurs to conduct trade among these markets.

Within the *market economy* portion of the PCETM, four tasks evolve that are relevant to the military's role:

- a. Assess the depth of the private sector, including distribution channels, to quickly foster the growth of local markets. In most conflict areas, some markets existed prior to the conflict, but often need additional security, space, or infrastructure to make them viable again. The private sector assessment is a task suited for a Civil Affairs team in the local area, but can also be conducted by any military element engaged with the population and conducting civil military operations.
- b. Develop micro enterprise/credit entities to provide quick funds for budding entrepreneurs who can start small businesses in the local economy. These businesses can range from a food stand to a construction company. Simple or complex, small businesses still represent essential cogs in the development of the market economy. A parallel trend in research of post-conflict economic stabilization has occurred in the area of micro credit. The recent Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Muhammad Yunus and his Grameen Bank highlights the recognized role in conflict prevention and mitigation played by small-scale economic development.⁸ In addition to Grameen Bank, USAID and other international organizations are a strong source of funding.⁹
- c. Assess and utilize state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Frequent remnants found in conflict areas are SOEs, which for years provided large-scale employment in a typically inefficient manner. The failure of state ownership manifests itself in degrading plant infrastructure and production facilities. While these SOEs will not likely succeed in a more advanced economy, they could function for a good period of time during development of the economy in the conflict area. Although SOEs may be inefficient symbols of previous regimes, the benefits may far outweigh these negatives. The reality is that SOEs are a major source of employment, health care, and community activity; their reopening also means locally produced materials are going toward local development projects.
- d. Assess and secure access to valuable natural resources. Many conflict areas in recent history were endowed with valuable natural resources that formed a significant portion of the past, present, and future gross national product. Additionally,

the wealth gained from these natural resources is often distributed only to the elite of a particular society. The control allowed them to perpetuate their hold on power. During times of chaotic conflict, these resources can also become a significant source of funds to perpetuate guerilla or insurgent activities. Consequently, securing access to these resources becomes a paramount planning consideration during major offensive operations. Once secured, the U.S. military can work with partner nations to develop this segment of the economy and ensure an equal and transparent distribution of profits gained from the sale of the commodities.

Agricultural Development. The agriculture sector in conflict areas is in many cases severely disrupted by the conflict and may not even be able to conduct small-scale subsistent farming. Tasks in this subcategory center around providing the means for local communities, regions, and national governments to produce enough food for their respective populations. Once that objective is met, agricultural commodities can provide a valuable source of exports. During this agricultural development, careful planning is required to slowly wean the farmers off illicit cash crops toward more long-term legal agricultural commodities.

The first task for military planners is much like those mentioned for natural resources, securing and controlling access to existing supplies as quickly as possible to prevent spoilage and looting of harvested crops. If any food remains in the food distribution system, it must be equally distributed and supplemented with foreign aid to provide a bridge until locally produced crops can begin filling the gaps. It is important to shift population attention away from food distribution points, like Iraq's Food for Oil program, to developing food markets. The food markets represent the future method for efficient acquisition of foodstuffs by the population and should be strongly supported.

The next task is thoroughly assessing the means of agriculture. The Civil Affairs teams conduct the assessment with assistance from U.S. Department of Agriculture experts, USAID, or a host of international and nongovernmental organizations. The complete assessment will include a catalog of all agriculture inputs available (e.g., water and fertilizer) and more importantly, a climatic and soil study

to determine crop suitability. The local population can be a valuable member of the assessment team in this area. Their knowledge of local growing conditions, crops, and cultivation expertise may go back decades.

The final task is identifying and establishing agricultural transportation and distribution networks. Synchronized planning to develop efficient farm-to-market transportation and distribution networks supports market economies and employment generation and can create substantial impact on the population. Imagine an employment project that builds a farm-to-market road, storage facilities, and a farmer's market to support a local community. This type of coordinated activity between the local population, the military, and its partners can expedite the stabilization of an area

Infrastructure Development. The final area of economic stabilization activity involves the development of sufficient infrastructure to support current economic activity and long-term economic growth. The initial assessment of the condition of infrastructure should focus on four areas to determine priorities for development projects: a) transportation, b) energy, c) general (water, sewer), and d) telecommunications and public information. The best organization to conduct these assessments and facilitate the prioritization of projects is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). They are extremely adaptable, and their experts can deploy quickly to assist in these tasks.

Transportation infrastructure is important in economic stabilization. Whether it is the development of farm-to-market roads or large inter-regional access roads to facilitate the expansion of market activities, transportation provides the catalyst to economic development. What is required for the transportation infrastructure is what is sufficient, not necessarily the most efficient. A gravel road built today is initially more important to the economy than a four-lane asphalt highway. The military must think in terms of the development of an extensive network of market roads to facilitate large inclusion in the economic stabilization activities. This planning may involve the military having to build alternate roads for military use—tailored to the needs of military vehicles—in order to prevent disrupting the flow of goods to the population.

Energy infrastructure began with the discussion of natural resources. The focus is providing a quick demonstration of a func-

tioning government (electricity) as well as source of export dollars (oil, natural gas). Widespread access to electricity and fuels also facilitates the expansion of industrial and agricultural economic activity. A note of caution concerning this area of infrastructure is that it takes time and expertise (usually not found in the conflict area). It is also highly susceptible to sabotage and attack. While an important element for long-term economic stabilization, the energy infrastructure should not be a large portion of the initial infrastructure development. Besides transportation, the development of the general infrastructure is a more important focus.

The general infrastructure is categorized to include facilities that promote government deliverance of key services such as health care, sewage, trash, water, and governance. Water and health care infrastructure can provide immediate satisfaction of some basic needs of the population. With these basic needs satisfied, the population can begin to focus on economic activities and support the established local, regional, or national governments whose continuing success is key to termination of U.S. military involvement in the conflict area.

Finally, the telecommunications and public information infrastructure assists in communicating among the population to coordinate economic activity (connects buyer with producer) and facilitates the government's ability to communicate with the population in a transparent and productive manner. A thorough cultural assessment should include the formal and informal communication channels of the local population. Less developed and often illiterate populations often rely on much different sources of information such as mosques and imams. Giving this type of population, a cell phone may not be the best initial approach to public information infrastructure development.

Conclusion

This paper describes the difficult contemporary operating environment in which the U.S. military must assume roles and responsibilities in the area of economic stabilization and development tasks. The inevitability of this involvement is clear and points toward partner agencies that may provide some assistance at various stages of stabilization operations. The PCETM in the areas of employment generation, market economy, agricultural development, and infrastructure

development provides the military planner an excellent framework for planning and operating in the economic arena. Finally, important changes in the U.S. military would facilitate the conduct of economic stabilization activities in the future.

Three key changes could greatly improve the U.S. military's capability to conduct economic stabilization:

- a. Conduct economic stabilization and development planning parallel with other military planning. A clear understanding of the post-conflict economic stabilization plan could help military planners mitigate the effects of offensive military operations on the economic activity in a conflict area.
- b. Fully supply the economic stabilization plan with money and manpower. Ideally, the partner agencies could provide the bulk of these resources, but the military planner must allocate military resources to the plan if these civilian resources are unavailable.
- c. Develop special education programs for military planners in the field of economic stabilization and development. Partnership with the other U.S. governmental agencies to conduct this training. In addition, conduct staff exchanges with inter-agency partners to provide the military planner the skills and knowledge needed for planning economic stabilization and development. ↑

Endnotes

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3. *Ibid*, 2.
4. John C Buss, "The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and Its Interaction with the Department of Defense," Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College Point Paper 09-5 (July 2005) 2.
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6. Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks (April 2005), Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction, Washington DC; available from www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/52959.htm (accessed 18 March 2007).

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9. See www.microcreditsummit.org.

